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HARMONIZING WATER RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT AND USE WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MUNICIPAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUDWIK A. TECLAFF*
MUNICIPAL LAW
The relationship of water law to the environment has gone
through three phases. In the first and longest period, any protection
of the environment that could be attributed to water law was an
incidental by-product of legal restraints on the development of water
resources per se. In the second period, all restraints were thrown to the
winds and the law actively fostered an unbridled development of
water resources without regard to the consequences for the environment. In the third period, which began little more than a decade ago,
water law is being slowly and hesitantly reshaped to fit into the
evolving perception of the environment as a unity in which changes
in one element must be harmonized with the effects on all the other
elements.
Looking Back-The First Two Phases'
During the first period, law tended to preserve water usage virtually unchanged. Immemorial custom prevailed, inhibiting development and minimizing interference with surface flow as much as
possible. This was exemplified in Europe by the widely accepted
maxim, aqua currit et debet currere ut currere solebat.2 In the 19th
century it was embodied in the natural flow version of the riparian
rights doctrine, which spread from Europe to the United States,
Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. By discouraging consumptive uses and by limiting non-consumptive uses to riparian land, it
kept the impact of water development on other elements of the
environment to a minimum and made harmonization of such impact
hardly necessary. This phase was by no means limited to Europe or
to areas of water abundance, though perhaps it was more pronounced in them. Even in arid and semi-arid regions, where water
was intensively utilized, customary law by its very nature acted as a
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See generally on historical aspects of water resources development and its relationship
to the environment, Environmental Quality and Water Development (Goldman et al., eds.
1973); L. Teclaff, The River Basin in History and Law (1967); and Teclaff, Abstraction and
Use of Water: A Comparison of Legal Regimes 8-56 passim U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/154 (1972).
2. Water runs, and ought to run, as it used to run. Quoted in Shury v. Piggot, 81 Eng.
Rep. 280, 281 (K.B. 1625).
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brake on sudden changes and harsh impacts. The low level of technical efficiency and the conservatism of the law together helped to
preserve a balance which had been brought about over a long period
of time through the interaction of diverse elements of the environment. Moslem customary law provides typical examples.'
In the second half of the 19th century and in the more industrially
advanced nations, a new phase in the relationship between water law
and the environment was ushered in by large-scale and intensive
development of water resources.' The constraints inherent in laws
which had been well adapted to low-intensity or routine utilization
of past eras began to be relaxed or not enforced. While the antipollution constraints of the natural flow theory of the riparian rights
doctrine occasionally reappeared,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was closer to the popular opinion of the day, 1886, in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson,6 holding that pollution of a stream by a coal
mine to the detriment of a lower riparian was a permissible use:
".. . we are of opinion that mere private personal inconveniences,

arising in this way and under such circumstances, must yield to the
necessities of a great public industry, which, although in the hands
of a private corporation, subserves a great public interest." 7
This view helped to bring about changes in riparianism. Under the
so-called reasonable use doctrine, it became, in the eastern United
States, an admirable vehicle for the propagation of developmental
concepts. Courts were reluctant to enjoin a use, once its social utility
was established, simply because it caused pollution. At best they
might award damages, thereby legalizing and perpetuating any injury
inflicted on the environment.' Similarly, in South Africa, the
3. No one might alter an established irrigation system or the manner or extent of exercise
of the irrigation use right. Upstream land had to be irrigated before downstream land
(thereby preventing waste of water in transmission); water must be returned to its normal
course after use; a strip of land, or harim, was always left along canals and around wells and
other water sources, and in this strip it was forbidden to dig a new well (so as not to deplete
the quantity or degrade the quality of water in existing wells). See Caponera, Water Laws in
Moslem Countries 16, 18, 21-22, F.A.O. Irrigation and Drainage Paper 20/1 (1973).
4. For a history of technical advances in water utilization, see Ackerman & Lbf, Technology in American Water Development 221-32 (1959).
5. As in Whalen v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913) and
Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900), where the social benefit of the
polluters' activities was set aside by the court in favor of the traditional requirement that
water flow past a riparian property "without obstruction, diversion, or corruption." 57 N.E.
719,721 (1900).
6. 113 Pa. St. 126,6 A. 453 (1886).
7. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886). See also J. Sax,
Water Law, Planning & Policy 422 (1968).
8. The case of Michelson v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1945), illustrates the
weighing of equities by the courts that was inherent in the reasonable use doctrine where
water pollution was involved.
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riparian rights doctrine was modified by allowing water use on nonriparian land when the social interest demanded;9 this modification
was adopted to some extent in England and Wales by the 1963 Water
Resources Act.' 0 Obviously, non-riparian use allows water development to have an impact on larger areas.
The prior appropriation system, which became dominant in the
western United States, suited developmental interests in water use
even better.'
By divorcing water use from land ownership, it
opened water resources to a larger number of people than did the
riparian rights doctrine. By giving preference to earlier over later
users, it assured water to the most development-minded-those who
were able to complete their projects first and fastest-and minimized
interference on the part of the administration. By tying the right to
private beneficial use, prior appropriation made it difficult for the
user to conserve water or to pay heed to the effects of his development upon the environment, since under no circumstances could the
water flow unchanged and undiminished but had to be diverted and
used to the utmost. Moreover, since the right could be lost if not
applied to beneficial use within a specified period of time, and since
it was limited to the amount of water that could beneficially be used,
the appropriator was induced to apply for far more water than he
really needed, and to use it wastefully and by the most primitive
means. Water conserved, either by good management or by technological improvement, was regarded as not beneficially used and
might result in loss of right.' 2
Thus, the application of the beneficial use concept contributed in
the western United States to overdevelopment of rivers and to a
horrendous mismanagement of the resource. When the damage was
sufficiently great to threaten navigation, as in California, 3 where
hydraulic mining had destroyed streams, buried large areas of fertile

9. South Africa, Water Act No. 54 of 1956, § I1(2)(2b).
10. United Kingdom, Water Resources Act 1963, c. 38. According to this Act, § 24(2),
the owner of land contiguous to inland water can abstract an unlimited quantity, not only
for domestic, but also for agricultural uses (excluding spray irrigation) on a holding consisting of contiguous land "with or without other land held herewith." But, determination of
the extent of contiguous land is made by the administrative agencies. § 55.
11. See generally on prior appropriation, Teclaff and Teclaff, A History of Water
Development and Environmental Quality, in Goldman supra note 1, at 45-48.
12. See e.g., Blaine County Inv. Co. v. Mays, 49 Idaho 776, 291 P. 1055 (1930) (not a
beneficial use to flood land in winter so as to conserve soil moisture into growing season);
Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 135 Nebr. 827, 284 N.W. 326 (1939) (prevailing custom to be
observed in applying water to land, not the latest and most approved scientific method),
13. For a vivid description of the damage, see Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel
Mining Company, 18 F. 753 (C.C. Cal. 1884).
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farmland under mining debris, and forced cities to build high levees
for flood protection, the federal government stepped in. The California Debris Commission, created in 1893 with power to grant
permits for hydraulic mining, improve river navigability, and investigate reservoir sites, was the first federal agency in the water resources
field with a multi-purpose objective and so became a harbinger of
new trends in water management.' 4
The idea of using the river basin to make more efficient use of
water originated at the end of the 19th century.' I The discovery of
the river basin as a natural unit of water distribution and the application of this unity to the planning of water resources exploitation
brought water law closer still to the needs of development. It
permitted fuller utilization of water resources by linking them with a
defined and self-contained area. Greatly increased demand for water
made this desirable: technology made it feasible. Basin-wide planning
for optimal water resources management and use became a slowly
developing but constant theme. In the United States it gained
momentum during the administrations of Presidents Theodore
Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt, reaching a peak in the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority.' 6 The TVA was
especially influential in underdeveloped areas of the world and the
river basin came to be regarded as an all-purpose unit for the achievement of economic and social goals. The Damodar Valley Corporation, the Gal Oya Development Board, and the Regional Corporation
of the Cauca Valley are three notable examples of this viewpoint
translated into practice. 1 The United Nations itself gave the concept of basin-wide planning official endorsement in 1956, when the
Secretary-General declared that "river basin development is now
recognized as an essential feature of economic development."' 8
The ultimate union of law and development was achieved in the
wholly artificial management unit created by inter-basin transfer of
water. Even while the river basin appeared to become universally
established as a unit of water development, engineers were discovering that, given the technical means, river basin boundaries could be
transgressed and units of water development created almost at will.
14. California Debris Commission Act, 33 U.S.C. § 661 et seq. (1970).
15. One of the pioneers in the concept of basin development was the British engineer, Sir
William Willcocks, who had already planned, in 1890, the harnessing of the Nile by the
Aswan Dam. Willcocks, The Nile Reservoir at Aswan and After 10-36 (1901).
16. Tennessee Valley Act, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1970).
17. India, Damodar Valley Corporation, Act No. 14, Mar. 27, 1948, 6 India Code 13-33
(1956); Sri Lanka, Gal Oya Development Board, Act No. 51, Nov. 24, 1949 (Ceyl.);
Colombia, Presidential Decree No. 1707, July 18, 1960 (also known as the CVC Act).
18. U.N. EcoSoc Coun., Off. Rec., 21st Sess., Annexes at 6 U.N. Doc. E/2827 (1956).
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In some areas of fairly acute water shortage, planners had been turning more and more to inter-basin transfers of water over long distances and on a very big scale. There are many examples, some
already in existence, some still on the drawing board. They include:
the Lower Rhone-Languedoc project in southern France;" the
Texas Water Plan ;2 0 the Snowy Mountains Project in Australia;2
the Israeli National Water Carrier; 22 the California State Water
Project;2 3 the half-dozen plans for combining waters of the Columbia, and even of Alaskan rivers, with those of the Colorado and other
western United States rivers;2 4 the Soviet project to divert water
from the great north-flowing rivers of Siberia to the arid interior of
Central Asia;2 and, most recently, the Indian proposal to link the
Ganga and Cauvery rivers by a 2,000-mile-long canal.2 6
Large-scale projects find a congenial legal framework in the administrative system of water disposition, because it has two characteristics that especially facilitate such development- centralization
and flexibility in decision-making. The administrative system has
become dominant in water legislation since the second half of the
nineteenth century, when permit systems became established in some
German states and when, in Canada and Australia, the rights of
riparian owners to use water without authorization were confined to
domestic purposes.2 7 It took a long time to become established in
some parts of the world, such as South America. For instance, Chile
did not abrogate its riparian system until 1951 and Venezuela is only
19. See Compagnie Nationale d'Am~nagement de la R6gion du Bas-Rh~ne et du
Languedoc, Irrigation and Allied Projectsin the Lower RhOne and Languedoc Districts of
Southern France (mimeographed, 1964).
20. Quinn, Water Transfers-Must the American West be Won Again?, 58 Geog. Rev. 108,
116-18 (1968).
21. Australia, Snowy Mountains Authority, The Snowy Mountains (pamphlet, 1963).
22. Israel, Ministry of Agriculture, Israel's Water Economy (pamphlet, 1973).
23. Graham, The Central Valley Project: Resource Development of a Natural Basin, 38
Calif. L. Rev. 588 (1950).
24. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Pacific Southwest Water Plan (1963); and Quinn, Area-ofOrigin Protectionism in Western Waters (Canada, Inland Waters Directorate, Water Planning
and Management Branch) (1973).
25. Vendrov, Water Management Problems of Western Siberia, Soy. Geog. 13-23 (May
1964) (transl. from Izvestiya Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R., 1 Ser. Geogr. 36-44 1963).
26. India, Central Water and Power Comm'n, Water Wing, Note on National Water Grid
of India (1973).
27. See generally on administrative systems, Teclaff, Abstraction and Use of Water, supra
note 1, at 17-56. On the German states, see Schmidt, Wasserrecht, 6 Handw6rterbuch der
Rechtswissenschaft 788-96 (1929). In Canada, riparian rights were reduced to domestic
purposes by the Irrigation Act of 1906, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. 61, sec. 11 (1906) (in Saskatchewan and Alberta), and by the Water Act of 1909, Stat. of the Province of British Columbia,
ch. 48, sec. 4 (1909) (in British Columbia). For Australia, see Vict., Water Act of 1958, Act
No. 6413, § § 4(1), 6, 14, 204, 8 Gen. Pub. Acts 749 (Vict. 1958), and New South Wales,
Water Rights Act of 1896, 60 Vict. 20, 1 N.S.W. Stat. 1894-97 (1898).
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now divesting itself of the last remnants of riparianism. 2 8 But even
in the predominantly riparian eastern United States, the administrative system is found at the federal level in the congressional power to
regulate and dispose of the waters of navigable streams without
regard to state law or to the acquired rights of individuals. 2 9
Awakening Awareness of EnvironmentalDamage From Waterworks
Because of the huge areas potentially affected and the sheer scale
of the proposed development, the long-distance inter-basin transfers
evoked particular concern over the nature and scope of changes that
they would bring about in the environment. For instance, experts
were alarmed by the continental North American Water and Power
Alliance (NAWAPA) proposal, which involved shunting water from
Alaskan rivers through Canada into western United States river
systems. 30 An eminent hydrologist warned that NAWAPA would
put new load stresses on the earth's crust, posing a danger of earthquakes, would place volumes of unfrozen water over permanently
frozen ground, with the likelihood of setting off landslides, and
would deliver large quantities of cold water to warmer latitudes,
where it would increase evapotranspiration and bring about irreversible changes in climate. 3 ' The Soviet projects for turning the
Siberian rivers southward into Central Asia aroused grave doubts,
especially as to the wisdom of constructing huge reservoirs in the
swampy lowlands of western Siberia and north European Russia,
which were already zones of excess moisture. Soviet experts pointed
to the effects of some existing large reservoirs; for example, the
Rybinsk reservoir was known to have brought about changes in
climate and vegetation that were felt a considerable distance from its
shores.3 2
28. Chile, Codigo de Aguas, 1951, Ley No. 9.909, Diario oficial No. 21, 960 (1951), 38
Recopilacion de Leyes por Orden Numerico 234 (Chile 1951). Venezuela trimmed
riparianism considerably by the Agrarian Reform Act of 1960 (text and English transl. in 9
F.A.O., Food and Agricultural Legislation, No. 2 (1960)), and is now completing the
process in current reform of the Water Law. See Brewer-Carias, Derecho y Administraci6n
de las Aguas y otros Recursos Naturales Renovables 79-90, 147-54 (1976).
29. This power is derived from Congress' right to regulate interstate and international
commerce, and was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.

546 (1963).
30. For a description of NAWAPA, see U.S. Senate, Comm. on Pub. Works Special
Subcomm. on Western Water Dev., Western Water Dev. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
31. Remarks before the 1966 International Water Quality Symposium in Montreal
Canada, 112 Cong. Rec. 20202, 20204 (daily ed., Aug. 29, 1966).
32. Vendrov, A Forecast of Changes in Natural Conditions in the Northern Ob'Basin in
Case of Construction of the Lower Ob' Hydro Project, 6 Soy. Geog., No. 10, at 3 (Dec.
1965) (transl. from Izvestiya Akademii Nauk, S.S.S.R., Ser. Geogr. No. 5, at 37, 1965); and
Vendrov, GeographicalAspects of the Problem of DivertingPart of the Flow of the Pechora
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Inter-basin transfers are only one among many types of water
development with potentially adverse impacts. As the scale of water
projects generally has increased, it has become necessary to take
notice of the detrimental effects of dams, reservoirs, canals and other
water works which hitherto were unquestioningly accepted as being
wholly beneficial. Among these detrimental effects are pollution,
salinization and sedimentation, loss of wetlands through dredging and
filling, loss of free-flowing rivers through flood control and channelization, damage to anadromous and other fisheries, salt-water intrusion in coastal areas, and injury to estuarine habitat and estuarine
living resources through reduction of fresh-water flow. Some of the
impacts are felt in the area of impoundment, some downstream from
water storage and diversion projects, some along the conveyance
route of the water, and some in the area of use. Where several dams
and reservoirs are built in succession, the cumulation of primary and
secondary effects may be damaging to a very large area. For example,
the steady decline in the level of the Caspian Sea, though due in part
to climatic changes, was greatly aggravated by the building of the
Greater Volga project (with its seven large and several smaller reservoirs). Filtration and evaporation from the reservoir surfaces contributed to the resulting loss of stream-flow into the Sea, as did the
expansion of consumptive uses, especially irrigation. Apart from the
injury to navigation, to the oil industry, and to livestock farming
along the Caspian shores, untold damage was caused to fisheries. The
construction of these projects was estimated to have caused the loss
of all the natural spawning grounds of the beluga sturgeon and the
Caspian whitefish, as well as severe injury to other fish populations. 3 3
As one of the first areas to realize the benefits of large-scale water
development projects, the United States also provides numerous
examples of their adverse effects upon the environment. These are
chronicled in contemporary accounts, in public hearings, and in
congressional and government agency reports. The initial impact of
the big reservoir projects was felt in the areas inundated by the
impoundment-in loss of fertile farmland, of historic sites, and of
wildlife habitat and scenic values (even though these might be replaced by other habitat and other aesthetic values). Such impacts are
apt to be speedily forgotten, but the bitter battles waged over dams
in the West (from Hetch Hetchy, which was the first major U.S. test
and Vychegda Rivers to the Volga Basin, 4 Soy. Geog. No. 6, at 29 (June 1963) (transl.
from Izvestiya Akademii Nauk, S.S.S.R., Ser. Geogr., No. 2, at 35, 1963).
33. Bobrov, The Transformation of the Caspian Sea, 2 Soy. 119 Geog. 47 (Sept. 1961)
(transi. from Geografiya v. Shkole, No. 2, at 5, 1961).
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of water development versus environmental quality, to Grand
34
Canyon) fully reveal the price paid for large-scale impoundments.
Other impacts were not felt until much later, long after the dams
and reservoirs were built and the planners and engineers had moved
on to new projects. In 1967, for example, a Senate resolution asked
the Congress to enact legislation for the establishment of subimpoundments adjacent to Missouri River Basin reservoirs in the
State of South Dakota. 3
Hoover Dam also required remedial
"surgery" years after its inauguration. Downstream from the dam the
flow of the Colorado River was reduced to about a third of its
previous volume. Vegetation flourished in shallow, exposed portions
of the bed, creating a swamp twelve miles by five at its most extensive, with polluted groundwater, in the area of the town of Needles,
where the river dumped much of the silt load it had picked up below
the dam. The result was disastrous flooding at Needles, which could
only be remedied by a large dredging and levee program. Eventually,
after the establishment by Congress of the Colorado River Front
Work and Levee System in 1946, the entire section between Davis
Dam and the Mexican border was channelized, but this in turn
36
destroyed the Colorado Delta.
Deltas and estuaries are particularly vulnerable to environmental
damage from water development works. The very existence of the
Florida Everglades, a huge subtropical estuarine area, was threatened
by the flood control and drainage systems of the Central and
Southern Florida Project, which cut off much of the supply of
seasonal surplus water that used to inundate the innumerable shallow
ponds of this unique national park. 3 7 A 1970 Act of Congress, requiring that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to furnish enough
34. See Nash, Rivers and Americans" A Century of Conflicting Priorities, in Goldman,
supra note 1, at 82-93.
35. The resolution noted that in the original development, the timber from the
inundated lands was not removed and had become an "offense to man and nature," and that
fluctuations in reservoir level had created mud-flats and swamps which were a "danger to
man and animals, wild and domestic." The sub-impoundments were urged in order to
maintain water levels in the reservoirs which:
...while only restoring but a small part of the natural beauty and cover of the
shore-line, lost by the creation of said reservoirs, would cause an amount of
restoration which would ameliorate the unnatural and offensive conditions
now existent along said shore-line to some degree.
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, Cong. Rec. § 4277 (daily ed., Mar. 23, 1967).
The question why there were no plans for such sub-impoundments in the original 1944
legislation authorizing the development was apparently not raised.
36. Berkman & Viscusi, Damming the West 47-54 (Ralph Nader's Study Group Report
on the Bureau of Reclamation, 1972).
37. See 113 Cong. Rec. H16362 (daily ed., Dec. 6, 1967) and H17195 (daily ed., Dec.
15, 1967), and 114 Cong. Rec. H6573 (daily ed., July 15, 1968).
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water for the park from impoundments north of it, has assured the
minimum deliveries necessary for the park's existence." Nothing,
however, can alter the fact that the population of wading birds
inhabiting the Everglades shrank within 25 years from an estimated
one and a half million to about one-third of that figure. 3
Much more detailed information about the kinds of damage that
water developiment projects might inflict on estuarine areas began to
be available in the briefs and reports of suits instituted by environmental organizations. An example is Sierra Club v. Froehlke,4 0
brought on behalf of conservationists, sportsmen, shrimp fishermen
and others who "derived benefit from the Trinity River, Trinity Bay
and surrounding areas in their natural state," to enjoin further work
on the Wallisville Project segment of the Trinity River navigation
improvement scheme. The complaint emphasized that the Corps of
Engineers intended to cut out 184 of the natural meanders of the
Trinity and convert it into a barge canal. The construction of this
project, plaintiffs were prepared to show, would:
"... destroy thousands of acres of bottomland and hundreds of
thousands of trees between Fort Worth-Dallas and the Gulf of
Mexico. Numerous game, fish and other wildlife will lose their
habitat and perish. Industrial and population growth will be thereby
encouraged in over-developed areas with resulting pollution and
urban problems. Construction of the projected barge canal across
Texas will concentrate heavy industry along its banks which, when
considered with the trafficking of barges and boats up and down the
canal, shall reduce the free-flowing Trinity River to a series of placid
pools with polluted and stagnant water.''
The Wallisville Project moreover, would convert a large area of saltwater marshland into a freshwater reservoir, not only destroying the
habitat of some rare and endangered species of wildlife, but causing
substantial potential harm to commercial fisheries (a position in
which several federal and state agencies concurred). 4
The environmental damage done by large-scale projects in the
developing countries has only recently begun to'be evaluated, but the
results to date have already shown that the impacts may be even
more severe, especially in the tropics, than in the, largely temperate,
38. Pub. L. No. 91-282, 84 Stat. 310 (1970).
39. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Third Annual Rep't,. Environmental
Quality 328 (1972).
40. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (1973), reV'd sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. 359 F. Supp. 1309 (1973).
42. Id., at 1309, 1310.
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developed areas of the world.' 3 A U.N. report on integrated river
basin development came to the conclusion in 1970 that:
"the environmental changes due to the construction of dams and of
man-made lakes, to the creation of expansion of irrigation systems
or to the draining of swamps and marshes can ... have far-reaching
44
effects on the health of man and animals in the regions affected."
There are a number of causes for these destructive impacts: the
fragility of tropical ecosystems; the huge size and enormous hydropower and irrigation potential of the rivers involved; the consequent
potential for widespread dissemination of pests and diseases; pressure
to produce quick results, especially in agriculture, in areas of rapidly
growing population; and the transfer of technology from developed
to developing countries without regard to fundamental differences in
4
both the physical and social environment . 1
The socio-cultural effect of water-resources development on local
populations has been one of the least understood and perhaps most
lightly regarded of all types of impact. This has resulted largely from
the fact that projects have all too often been pushed forward rapidly
with outside technical and financial assistance but without any
involvement of the local people in the decision-making process. As
the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE)
observed wryly, "most of the serious human population dislocations
have occurred in tropical situations, partly because large displacement would be political suicide in some temperate areas such as
France." 4 6
Study of socio-cultural systems in the path of such development
has so far concentrated on African populations forced to relocate
from the impoundment area of large dams and the hosts among
whom they are resettled. It has been shown, from research on such
large projects as the Kariba, Volta and Kainji dams and the Aswan
43. See Comment, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of International Development,
5 Ecol. L.Q. 321 (1976), and studies cited therein.
44. U.N., Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Aff., Integrated River Basin Development: Report o1 a
Panel of Experts, Annex IV, at 60, U.N. Doc. E/3066/Rev. 1 (1970).
45. The secondary effects of large-scale projects, especially rapid growth in population,
also contribute to the environmental damage. In 1800 Egypt had approximately one person
for every acre of arable land: today, after construction of two major dams on the Nile and
irrigation of milliops of new acres, there are four persons for every arable acre and seventy
per cent of the irrigated land is affected by water-logging and buildup of salts in the soil. See
remarks of Prof. Mohammed Kassas of Cairo University and Clyde E. Houston of FAO at
the symposium on irrigation of arid lands, held at Alexandria in March 1976, and reported
in New York Times, Mar. 7, 1976, at 10, col. 1.
46. Int'l Coun. of Sci. Unions, Sci. Comm. on Problems of the Environment, Man-Made
Lakes as Modified Ecosystems 16 (1972).
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High Dam, that compulsory relocation produces great stress.4 " This
is expressed in grief over lost homes and flooded burial sites and
religious shrines, in anxiety over resettlement, in the undermining of
local leadership, and in a cultural impoverishment when customs and
rituals associated with the lost home are abandoned. Relocatees
tended to cling to familiar habits and institutions, and rejected or
resisted the changes in agricultural techniques, land utilization, and
social organization which governments attempted to introduce as
part of a simultaneous area-wide development. It becomes a question, then, whether these huge projects involving large numbers of
people are really worth the human and environmental injury
inflicted. Lack of sufficient data, failure to take these factors into
account and failure to make even a rudimentary assessment of their
value have so far obscured the true costs of development. It has been
suggested that if relocation is done humanely, the expenses may even
exceed the cost of dam construction, and that if reasonable initial
estimates were formulated, alternatives to mainstream dams would
be more seriously considered.' I
Third Phase-Protectionof Water Resources
Legislation against the detrimental effects of water development
and use was enacted long before the era of big projects, but was
initially aimed at conservation of the water resource itself, and had a
bearing on other elements of the environment only insofar as these
elements were affected by constraints on water development. Among
the earliest efforts at protection of the water resource were pollution
control laws. At a time when the outlook was thoroughly utilitarian
and the aim was to reconcile conflicts between one developmental
use and another, as exemplified in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson,4 9 major anti-pollution laws were already in existence or
in process of being drafted. England already had its Rivers (Pollution
Prevention) Act of 1876,1 0 and in 1899, the United States produced
the Refuse Act,'
which would become, seventy years later, the
kingpin of the federal drive against environmental damage to waterways from a wide variety of sources. Another important early law
47.
tions,
16-26,
48.

See Scudder, Social Impacts of Integrated River Basin Development on Local PopulaUNDP/UN Interregional Seminar on River Basin and Interbasin Dev., Budapest,
Working Paper No. 30 (Sept. 1975).
Id. at 14-15.

49. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 110 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886), see text accompanying note 7 supra.
50. England and Wales, Rivers (Pollution Prevention) Act of 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 75.

51. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
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was the French statute of 1917. s 2 The problem with much of the
older legislation was its over-generalized prohibition of pollution,
which impeded enforcement. The Refuse Act, for example, lay
dormant for well over half a century.5 3
There are two basic means of pollution control: to reduce the
amount of wastes discharged, either by preventing them from entering the water or treating them to make them harmless, or to increase
and make more effective use of water's assimilative capacity. In
modem water quality control, the reduction or elimination of the
input of wastes is achieved by means of economic incentives,
economic disincentives (such as effluent charges), and standards.
Economic incentives take many forms, among them construction
subsidies, tax advantages, and preferential price setting. Effluent
charges have been around for a long time, originating in the Ruhr
Basin at the turn of the century,5 4 but have only recently begun to
be applied on a broad scale, placing the onus of pollution squarely on
the polluter. The embodiment of this concept in the polluter-pays
principle was expressed in Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) recommendations to member countries.' I
Its strong appeal from an environmental point of view is that it has
helped to internalize external costs and thereby permit a true evaluation of environmental factors in resource allocation.
Standards may be either water quality standards or effluent
standards. The former (also known as ambient or stream standards)
have a history almost as long as the early pollution laws; like effluent
charges, they were developed in the Ruhr Basin nearly three quarters
of a century ago through the classification of streams according to
their use. 6 They give a general indication of the desired water
quality in terms of a few parameters, but in order to meet the objectives which they set, they must be supplemented by effluent limitations either established on a case-by-case basis or given in advance for
52. France, Loi relative aux dtablissements dangereux, insalubres ou incommodes, 19
dec. 1917, text in 8 L6gislation de la Guerre de 1914-1918, Recueil Gdndral de Lois et des
Arrets (1917).
53. In United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), the Supreme Court
construed the statute as applying to any industrial waste, not merely discharges that might
obstruct navigation. See Zener, The Federal Law on Water Pollution Control, in Dolgin and
Guilbert, Fed. Environmental L. 682, 784-87 (1974).
54. See Kneese and Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions 244-53 (1968); also Fair, Pollution Abatement in the Ruhr District,in Comparisons in
Resource Management 152-53 (Jarrett ed. 1961).
55. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Recommendation of the
Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-PaysPrinciple, Nov. 14, 1974, 14 Int'l Leg.
Mat. 234 (1975).
56. See Teclaff, The River Basin, supra note 1, at 126.
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certain categories of pollution sources. Effluent limitations given for

particular categories of sources tend to be primarily and directly
geared to the level' of available technology and only indirectly and
more remotely to ambient standards.' I
The second basic means of pollution control-to increase the
assimilative capacity-is a developmental use of the resource in that it
involves construction of reservoirs and waterworks to store, transfer
and release the large quantities of diluting water required. It has been
used legitimately and successfully to prevent the poisoning of fish

and to reduce the salt content of irrigation water,' I but its misuse is
evident in the widespread employment of dilution to flush city

sewers and substitute for effective sewage treatment. 5 9 Just over a
decade ago in the United States, it was proposed to almost double
60
the capacity of the nation's reservoirs for water quality control,
but later a more environmentally oriented means of pollution prevention was adopted in the shape of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, which specifically forbid flow
augmentation in lieu of pollution control by adequate treatment. 6
57. See e.g., the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub, L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816, which require all point-source dischargers to meet effluent standards
based on best practicable control technology currently available by 1977, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1974), and on best available technology economically achievable
by 1983, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1974). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) (Supp. 1974)
relates the technology-based standards to water quality standards by requiring states to
identify those waters for which the effluent limitations are not stringent enough to meet the
water quality standards. The level of technology was defined in congressional debate on the
FWPCA in 118 Cong. Rec. S16873 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1972).
The principle of best available technology, as applied in Sweden, has been described as
follows:
A fundamental starting point for judging a case is that an enterprise is, in
principle, obliged to install the most efficient technological devices in use by
similar enterprises either here in Sweden or abroad. In other words, advantage
must be taken of all technological advances. When considering one application
for exemption, the Environment Protection Board has underscored this principle, and stated that the question of anti-pollution devices shall be judged on
the basis of what is technologically possible. This means that the very best
technical solution must be chosen, whether it has been proved here in Sweden
or elsewhere.
Sweden, Royal Ministry for Foreign Aff., Royal Ministry of Agriculture, National Environment Protection Board, Environment Protection Act... Information to the U.N. Conf. on
the Human Environment 27-28 (1972).
58. Paszto, Recent Trends in Water Quality Management and Protection in Hungary,
UNDP/UN Interregional Seminar on River Basin and Interbasin Dev., Budapest, 16-26,
Working Paper No. 15, at 11 (Sept. 1975).
59. See Wollman, The Water Resources of Chile 130 (1968).
60. See Krutilla, Is Public Intervention in Water Resources Development Conducive to
Economic Efficiency? 6 Nat. Res. J. 60, 70 (1966), citing U.S. Cong., H., Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations on Water Pollution Control
and Abatement, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1244 (1964).
61. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
(Supp.1976).
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Maintenance of a minimum flow, however, as distinct from flow
augmentation, is a legitimate, effective, and widely used6 2 method
of pollution prevention and control; moreover, it helps protect not
only the water resource per se, but also other elements of the
environment, especially estuarine areas and aquatic living resources
(including many marine fish species which spend part of their life
cycle in the brackish water of estuaries).
The actual determination of desired minimum flow depends on
circumstances. The British Water Resources Act, for instance, lays
down no hard and fast rules, beyond requiring each water authority
to determine "minimum acceptable flow" (MAF) at critical points
throughout its area.6 3 The administrative procedure is that the
regional water authority and the central Water Resources Board
together decide on what MAF determinations are to be made, and if
they cannot agree the decision is left to the Secretary of State for the

Environment. 6 4

The development of pollution control and of devices, such as the
minimum flow concept, for the protection of the water resource was
one response to an apparently ever increasing pressure on water
62. The minimum flow concept can be found in the 1963 Water Resources Act of
England and Wales, United Kingdom, Water Resources 1963, ch. 38, § 19, in the French
Code Rural, Art. 97-1, added by Law No. 64-1245 of 1964, and in statutes of a number of
the eastern and humid mid-western states of the United States, for a discussion of these
statutes and of the National Water Commission's proposals concerning establishment of
minimum flows in riparian states see Clark, ed., Waters and Water Rights, Vol. 7, § § 615,
615.1-615.2 (1976). In Switzerland, concessionaires for hydropower development must
ensure minimum discharges over the whole or part of a year to control sedimentation and
maintain the safe yield of diverted rivers. See Werenfels & Meylan, Water Development: A
European Experience, in Goldman, supra note 1, 454, 456. Minimum-flow provisions specifically to protect fresh water supplies from salt water intrusion are contained in Japan,
River Law, Law No. 167 of 1964, art. 1, and in the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, which authorize the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and other federal agencies to determine the need for storage to regulate streamflow to
that end, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-52(b)(1-6) (Supp. 1976).
63. United Kingdom, Water Resources Act 1963, c. 38, as amended by Water Act 1973,
c. 37.
64. See Craine, 'Water Management Innovations in England 55 (1969). In determining
minimum acceptable flow, the water authority is required to consider the character of the
water and its surroundings (especially its aesthetic value) and to specify a flow which must
not be less than the minimum necessary to safeguard public health and to meet quantity and
quality requirements of existing lawful uses. United Kingdom, Water Resources Act 1963, c.
38, § 19(5). The water authority is required also to consult with private and public water
undertakers, local water agencies (such as drainage boards, navigation, harbor, and conservancy authorities), and, as appropriate, with the Minister of Transport and the Central
Electricity Generating Board. Id. § 19(3). Prior to submission to the Secretary of State for
Environment, MAF proposals are made available for public inspection. The Secretary is
responsible for approval of MAFs and if he does not approve a proposal, he may direct the
Water Resources Board to prepare a substitute or introduce his own proposal. MAFs are
required to be reviewed on a continuing basis and amended, if necessary, at least every seven
years. Id. § § 20-21.
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supplies. Another response to this pressure was to look to out-ofbasin sources of surplus water instead of seeking a solution in conservation practices. But inter-basin transfers were fiercely resisted by
many of the areas of so-called water surplus, whose inhabitants often
felt that they were the victims of a new type of colonialism. This
feeling was epitomized in a paper prepared for a water law conference in Georgia some years ago:
A third general class of allocative system, I shall, for want of a better
name, describe as "empife building." The term is partly opprobrious
but primarily just descriptive. This system, or lack of system,
characterizes the huge distributive agencies that preside over grand
inter-regional transfers, agencies such as the San Francisco Water
Department, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,
the Bureau of Reclamation, the California Department of Water
Resources with its Feather River Project and California Water Plan,
and a few others. 6
It was brought out also at the Western Interstate Water Conference at
Corvallis, Ore., in 1965, when representatives of water-rich but
economically less developed states indicated that such states would
not let themselves be robbed of their patrimony by neighbors with
"grandiose plans" for future growth. 6 6
In the international sphere, the concept of water imperialism was
advanced by Henri Zurbr* gg, who declared that Switzerland must
not fall to the level of being a "water colony" of other European
countries.6 7 These tendencies were noted also by Abraham Hirsch in
a study of Middle Eastern rivers:
There has been in some instances a marked surrender of sovereign
rights by the upstream state in favor of facilitating utilization of the
waters of the river by the downstream state. Historically, the earliest
examples are those between a strong downstream state and a weak
upstream state. More recently, such instances have occurred between
equally strong states, among which a spirit of cooperation existed. 68
65. Gaffney, Comparison of Market Pricing and Other Means of Allocating Water Resources, in Water Law and Policy in the Southeast, Papers prepared for presentation at the
Southeastern Water Law Conference, University of Georgia, Nov. 7-10, 1961, 195 at 199
(1962).
66. See New York Times, Aug. 8, 1965, at 32, col. 1.
67. Zurbrbigg, Aspects juridiques du r6gime des eaux en Suisse 361 (1965). Zurbriigg
borrowed the term "water colony" from Hartig, who used it at a meeting of the Water Law
Committee of the International Law Association in reference to tendencies favorable to the
interests of downstream states, id. at 361, n. 68.
68. Hirsch, Utilization of InternationalRivers in the Middle East, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 81,
99 (1956).
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Such views have found a practical parallel in the statutes of some
states of the United States which restrict ouf-of-state or out-of-basin
transfers of water. Nearly seventy years ago, in Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter (1908), which concerned the planned transfer
of water from the Passaic River in New Jersey to Staten Island in the
State of New York, Justice Holmes upheld a state law prohibiting
export of water:
... few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a
State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially
undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of
the public welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a
more perfect use. 6 9
California law goes farther in its county-of-origin and watershedof-origin statutes to protect waters of areas smaller than the state
itself.7" The county-of-origin statute reflects the reluctance of
northern California 'counties to have their surplus water transferred
to southern California without proper compensation. The watershed
protection statute was construed by the attorney-general of California as giving priority to future uses of the areas of origin over all
uses of the receiving areas to the extent that water put to beneficial
use outside areas of origin can be withdrawn as area-of-origin needs
and uses develop. 7 I Similarly, the Texas legislature passed a statute
in 1965 requiring that all reasonable needs for a period of fifty years
be estimated
before plans for out-of-basin export of surplus water are
72
made.
At the federal level, there have been only a few indications of any
attempt to put the brakes on trans-basin diversion. The statute
authorizing the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project in Colorado mandates
conformity with the Colorado watershed-of-origin statute and prevents the Secretary of the Interior from using eminent domain to
acquire water rights for use outside the Fryingpan basin. 7 3 The
Supreme Court opinion in Arizona v. California (1963) upholds the
power of Congress to pass legislation reserving water for future needs
of states by interstate compact. 74 The Water Resources Planning Act
69. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
70. Calif. Water Code § 10505 (1971) is commonly referred to as the "county-of-origin"
statute. § § 11460 and 11463 of the California Water Code are the principal operative
provisions of the "watershed-of-origin" statute.
71. Construed in 25 Ops. Cal. Atty Gen. 8 (Opinion 53/298, filed Jan. 6, 1955).
72. Tex. Laws, 1965, ch. 297, § 2(b) at 588.

73. 43 U.S.C. § 616b(d) (1970).
74. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

October 1976]

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

of 1965, establishing the Water Resources Council and river basin
commissions, specifically declared that the act must not be construed
as authorizing any of these entities to study, plan or recommend
inter-basin transfers of water.s
These measures, of course, do not in any way hinder-indeed, they
foster-intrabasin development in areas of apparent surplus which
may eventually be just as damaging to the environment. One means
of forestalling such damage is the exclusion of certain waters from
development altogether. It has been put into practice in parts of the
West where scenic and recreational values made it desirable that some
waters be preserved from agricultural, power, or industrial use. In
Idaho, for example, the governor of the State may appropriate the
waters of certain lakes and springs in trust for the people, and in
Oregon, some streams that form beautiful waterfalls or are famous
for fishing have been reserved from appropriation. 76 On a federal
level, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 77 carried the concept
of choice between nonproductive and productive uses a stage further
by distinguishing between rivers and river valleys that were essentially untouched (wild), those that were accessible by road but
largely undeveloped (scenic), and those that were readily accessible
by road and already somewhat developed (recreational). Prior to
passage it met with formidable opposition in Congress and in some
federal agencies;7" the initial recommendations were whittled down
until only eight rivers were designated for immediate inclusion in the
system. Of those designated for further study, the influential chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
observed, in deference to developmental interests:
We have not "locked up" these rivers. If the Corps of Engineers, for
instance, wants to put a development in on any of them, all it has to
do is to advise the Secretary of the Interior ahead of time and
inform the Congress what the7 effect
of its development will be. Then
9
if Congress says OK, OK it is.
Third Phase-Attempts at Harmonization
Selective development of water resources already goes beyond protection of water alone in that it helps to mitigate damaging impacts
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1962-1 (1970).
76. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 67-4301-67-4311 (1973 and Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev, Stat.
§ § 538.110-538.300 (1973).
77. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. § § 1271-1287 (1970).
78. See generally on the history of the enactment, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3801 (1968); also Tarlock and Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 Cornell

L. Rev. 707 (1970), reprinted in 2 Env. L. Rev. 557 (1971).
79. See 114 Cong. Rec. 26590 (1968).
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on the area of great beauty and areas primarily suited to recreational
purposes or wildlife conservation. A more effective step in the overall
harmonization of development with conservation is the routine inclusion of environmental protection measures in the process of planning
and authorizing works that may be detrimental to the environment.
In the absence of statutory mandate such inclusion may be based on
an interdepartmental understanding like that between the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and the Department of the Interior in the
pre-NEPA era. 8 ° This agreement was an attempt to formalize
cooperation between the two agencies in combating pollution and
protecting the environment from adverse impacts of dredging, filling,
or excavation in navigable waters.
Sometimes consideration of environmental factors in licensing
may result from close cooperation between the licensing agency and
the environmental protection agency, as in Sweden, between the
National Environmental Protection Board (NEPB) and the Franchise
Boards which authorize water projects. 8 ' On occasion, the existing
powers of the licensing agency have been reinterpreted to encompass
the consideration of environmental factors. In the pre-NEPA era, for
example, courts in the United States construed the responsibilities of
the Federal Power Commission to include the duty to preserve wild
rivers and wilderness areas, anadromous fish, and wildlife, and to
protect conservation interests by ensuring that they were adequately
represented-not merely to adjudicate between development and
conservation.8 2
Licensing thus becomes a powerful tool in ad hoc assessment of
the impact of water projects and is useful in minimizing adverse
environmental effects as they appear or develop after construction,
when the impact of a project may have been difficult to foresee.
Continuation of the work may then be predicated on the presence or
absence of certain environmental effects as the project develops. In a
recent California decision, for example, the grant of a water right to
a large upstream diversion was made contingent upon two factors:
(1) the impact of the diversion, as it proceeded in stages for some
twenty years, upon estuarine water quality and other elements of the
80. District engineers of the Corps were required to coordinate their permit-granting with
the Interior divisions responsible for wildlife, pollution, and parks, and if differences could
not be resolved, they ,were referred for final decision to the topmost echelons of the two
agencies acting in consultation, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1969).
81. See Lundquist, Environmental policy and administration in a unitary state: Sweden,
in United Nations, EcoSoc, Organization and Administration of Environmental Programmes

126, 136-37 U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/16 (1974).
82. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); and Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1965).
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environment- and (2) the future development and improvement of
the data base used for evaluation of the project.8 3
The recent trend toward establishing departments or agencies
entrusted with the task of environmental protection creates favorable
conditions for a transition from informal to formal evaluation of
environmental factors. Though they may not always have the power
to prevent the construction of environmentally detrimental projects,
the fact that such agencies often promote studies and set standards
and that their heads have ministerial rank and take part in high-level
deliberations of the government assures at least some consideration
of environmental factors in the final decision. 4 This transition may
be further facilitated when the environmental agency is not only
entrusted with protection but also with development of all or some
elements of the environment. In England and Wales, for example, the
entire structure of water management, organized by river basins or
groups of river basins, was absorbed into the Department of the
Environment and was further consolidated by the Water Act of
1973, which created ten regional water authorities to replace the old
river authorities. 8 5 In East Germany, the national Water Management Agency, which was created in 1969, was absorbed in 1971,
together with seven regional water management authorities in the
major river basins, into the Ministry of Environmental Protection and
Water Management.' 6 Regional decentralization notwithstanding,
83. California State Water Resources Control Board, Delta Water Rights Decision, Dec.
1379 (July 1971), concerning the application by the State Department of Water Resources
and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation for appropriative water rights from the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta Water Supply. See also Richardson & Johnston, Environmental Values and
Water Quality Planning, 101 Journal of the Hydraulics Division, Proceedings of the American Soc. of Civ. Eng'rs, 266-67 (Feb. 1975).
84. Most of the developed and some of the developing countries of the world now have
separate environmental agencies. They include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Benin,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, German Federal
Republic, Ghana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, North Korea, Kuwait, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta,
Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.
Those which divide environmental responsibility among various agencies and ministries
include: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cameroon, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greece, Iraq, Malawi,
Maldives, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tanzania, and Zambia.
United Nations, Environment Programme (UNEP), The State of the Environment 1976,
Report of the Executive Director 14-15 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/58 (Jan. 30, 1976).
85. United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Environment Order, Stat. Instr. 1970,
No. 1681; Water Act, 1973, c. 37.
86. German Democratic Republic, Law of Feb. 5, 1969, Concerning the Agency for
Water Management [1969], BGB1. 11129; Public Notice of Jan. 3, 1972, on the Creation of
Ministries [1972], BGBl. 1118.
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when the developmental and protective aspects of water management
are thus consolidated in one agency, the environmental factors are at
least routinely considered; this does not necessarily mean the
elimination of developmental bias, despite the fact that the title of
such a body contains the word "environment" or "environmental."
Assessments formally mandated by statutes or regulations stand at
the apex of measures for the rational management of the environment because they command more respect and attention than the
best ad hoc arrangements. The effect of NEPA's mandate was
dramatic and apparent immediately upon passage of the Act, when
the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a lower
federal court decision that the Corps of Engineers had no power to
deny a water project license on ecological grounds.8 7 Some of the
statutes which stipulate environmental assessment, such as the new
Rumanian Environmental Code, create only a general obligation on
the part of government agencies to protect the environment and to
take environmental factors into consideration, without specifying
how this is to be done, or even mentioning an impact statement
procedure. 88 In this they differ only to a limited extent from
informal departmental arrangements.
There is less discretion left to the administration in the statutes
which, like NEPA, explicitly require a written evaluation of the
environmental effects of proposed actions or projects. The effectiveness of these statutes from the point of view of protection depends
on whether the criteria for assessment are contained in the act,
explicitly or impliedly, or are left to elaboration by subsequent
regulations, and the extent to which administrative decisions are
subject to the scrutiny of the public or an independent watchdog
agency.
In Canada, assessment and control of the environmental impact of
major federal development is delegated to the federal Department of
the Environment (also known as Environment Canada). The conditions of the assessment process, including the requirements for an
impact statement, derive remotely from the enabling statute, having
been established exclusively by the Department in regulations. 8 9 The
87. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
88. Rumania, Law on the Protection of the Environment, June 20, 1973, no. 9, text in
19 Rev. Roum. Sci. Soc.-Sci. Jurid. 59-87 (1975). The general mandate to all government
departments is contained in Art. 7, and for water protection in Art. 12.
89. The federal assessment process was instituted in May 1974. See 3 Canadian Env'tal L.
News 90-91 (June 1974), on which this description was based. The Canadian Department of
the Environment was established by the Government Organization Act 1971, Can. Rev.
Stat. c 42 (1971). Part I of this Act, dealing with the Department, is commonly cited as the
Department of the Environmental Act.
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process is applied to three types of projects: those undertaken
directly by the federal government, those involving federal funding,
and those involving use of federal Crown lands. Objectivity and
uniformity are to be assured by the Environmental Assessment Panel,
whose members are taken from various disciplines represented among
officials of Environment Canada, and whose main task is to issue
assessment procedures and guidelines for individual government
departments to use in making impact statements. In broad outline,
the procedures adopted make regional committees of the Department responsible for preliminary screening to determine if impact
statements are required. When an assessment is deemed necessary it is
sent, after examination and comment by the regional committees, to
the Environmental Assessment Panel, which may approve it or direct
that additional studies be made. The whole process seems to be
tightly controlled by the Department of the Environment.
The Colombian Natural Resources Code9 and the Australian
Environmental Protection Act 9 explicitly provide for impact statement preparation, but leave the elaboration of its requirements to
subordinate legislation. The Australian act is more detailed in that,
while it entrusts the development of procedures and criteria to subsequent orders of the Governor-General, it enumerates the kinds of
activities for which environmental assessment is to be made. 9 2 The
Order implementing the act leaves to the Minister the decision
whether an impact statement is required, 9 and, though he must
consider the factors enumerated in the Order,9 4 he may dispense with preparation of an impact statement when he deems that
such preparation would be against public policy. 9 s The Order also
permits the Minister to exempt whole classes of actions from the
impact statement requirement at the request of any department or
agency. 9 6 He seems to have almost complete discretion in the
matter, especially since he may withhold from the public the grounds
90. Colombia, National Code on Renewable Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (enacted by Decree No. 2811 of Dec. 18, 1974), 11 Diario Oficial 145 (Jan. 2,
1975). See Cano, Comprehensive Environmental Legislation: A Summary Review of Colombia's Environmental Code, 1 Env'tal Policy & Law 177 (1976). As leader of the FAO
team of technical assistance experts and advisor to the Colombian Government, Dr. Cano
played a major role in the drafting of this comprehensive code.
91. Australia, Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act, No. 164 of 1974, Dec.
17, 1974.
92. Id. § 5.
93. Australia, Governor-General, Order under Sub-section 6 (1) of the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974-1975, June 20, 1975, paragraph 3.1.1.
94. Id. paragraph 3.1.2.
95. Id. paragraph 3.1.3.
96. Id. paragraph 11.1.
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of the exemption for public interest reasons.9" The Australian assessment process seems to be as tightly controlled by the administration
as the Canadian federal one, perhaps even more so, since the
Governor-General's order can only be disapproved by parliament
within a limited period of time after it has been laid before the
legislature. 9 I
NEPA not only mandates the preparation of an impact statement,
but also sets both substantive 9 9 and procedural 00 criteria for the
assessment process. Though they have still to be systematized in the
agencies' regulations, these criteria set limits for the latitude of
agency interpretations of NEPA, and contained enough substance to
permit the courts to transform them into precise and binding directives.o1 Similarly, the Ontario impact statement, in contrast to the
Canadian federal environmental assessment, is mandated specifically
by statute. The Ontario Environmental Assessment Act of 1975 not
only enumerates activities for which impact statements may be
necessary, but also sets forth in considerable detail the contents of
the statement and describes the powers of the Minister and of the
independent Environmental Assessment Board.' 02 But, like the
federal regulations, it leaves the direction of the procedure and the
final decisions entirely in the hands of the Minister, who may disregard the findings of the Board.' 03
While the federal assessment process in Canada does not seem to
have had very much influence on the provincial procedures,' 1 4 in
97. Id. paragraph 11.5.
98. Australia, Environment Protection Act, supra note 97, sec. 7. For an informative
discussion of the Act, see Clark, Redcliff and Beyond: The Commonwealth Government and
Environmental Planning, 5 Adelaide L. Rev. 165 (1975); also, for a discussion of the
fundamental differences between Australian and U.S. administration of natural resources,
by the same author, see Conservation and Government: Towards an Understanding of Roles,
5 Search 241 (June 1974).
99. United States, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(b) (1970).
100. Id. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
101. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
102. Canada, Province of Ontario, Environmental Assessment Act, ch. 69, July 18, 1975,
§ § 3, 4, 5 (3), and 7-24. It may be noted that § 3(b) makes provision for future extension
of the impact statement process (by proclamation of the Lieutenant Governor) to major
commercial or -business enterprises, activities, or plans, independently of any government
involvement.
103. Id. § § 12(2)(b), 24(I)(a) & (b).
104. As a matter of fact, the environmental assessment provision in the City of Winnipeg
Act, Man. Stat., c. 105 (1971), was apparently patterned on NEPA and afforded the public
a larger scope of enforcement than is generally accorded it in Canada. Lucas, Legal Foundations for Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making, 16 Nat. Res. J. 72, 95-96
(1976), quotes in support the unreported Manitoba case of Stein v. The City of Winnipeg
(Manitoba Court of Appeal, June 10, 1974).
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the United States state impact statement procedures have been
patterned on and profoundly influenced by the federal statute.' Is
One underlying assumption in NEPA, however, developed in guidelines and in the federal case law, has not been followed unvaryingly
in state statutes and guidelines-that the soundness of the decisionmaking process is strengthened and safeguarded if it is open to public
scrutiny. The courts have emphasized this aspect of the assessment
process very strongly. In EDFv. Corps of Engineers, for example, the
court declared bluntly that:
Where experts, or concerned public or private organizations, or even
ordinary lay citizens bring to the attention of the responsible agency
environmental impacts which they contend will result from the
proposed agency action, then the § 102 statement should set forth
these contentions and opinions, even if the responsible agency finds
no merit in them whatsoever.' 06 (Emphasis added)
Likewise, the CEQ Guidelines are very specific on this point.
Public participation is to be encouraged at the earliest possible time;
agencies are to publicize the availability of draft environmental
impact statements (for example, in local newspapers or by directly
notifying interested groups); copies of draft statements are to be
provided without charge or at a nominal reproduction fee to organizations and individuals that request the opportunity to comment., 07
The Guidelines require agencies to actively seek out all major points
of view and discuss them in the draft statement, to make meaningful
reference in the final statement to the existence of any responsible
opposing view not adequately discussed in the draft, and to attach all
substantive comment received to the final statement, "whether or
not each such comment is thought to merit individual discussion by
the agency in the text of the statement."' 0 8
In most of the state statutes and guidelines public participation is
less broadly conceived. The Maryland statute, for example, restricts
comment to private organizations and individuals with jurisdiction
by law, special expertise, or recognized interest.' 09 In Montana,
pre-draft outlines of impact statements are to be circulated to
105. For a discussion of state environmental impact statement requirements, see CEQ
Fifth Annual Report 401-09 and Appendix (1974); and Trzyna, A ComparativeReview of
State EnvironmentalImpact Laws within a FederalSystem, I Earth LJ. 133 (1975).
106. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (1971).
107. CEQ, Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, § 1500.9(d),
38 Fed. Reg. 20550, 20555 (1973).

108. Id. § 1500.10(a).
109. Maryland Environmental Policy Act of 1973, Ann. Code of Md. NR § § 1-301,

1-304(b)(1) (1974).
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"selected" private groups and individuals, and to those whose interests will be "significantly" affected by the proposed action., 1 0 The
Montana statute calls for consultation with representatives of various
interests (industry, conservation organizations, labor, etc.) as "it
deems advisable." '1 I Some states make no provision for direct
public input to the impact statement procedure,' 1 2 and in one
instance, at least, the matter of consultation with the public is
wholly within the agencies' discretion.'1 3
Aside from the procedures mandated under NEPA, then, public
participation in the assessment process in the United States is little
developed; even less participation is evidenced elsewhere. Limitation
of the public's role is evident in the Australian and Ontario statutes,
though both provide for notification and permit the public to make
comments. According to the Australian statute, the Minister is not
required to make anything public, unless he receives a written request for particular information' 14 or unless he decides, in his discretion, to direct that an inquiry be conducted.1 1 I In the latter case,
he appoints a commission of inquiry, which is required to make
public its findings and recommendations (with certain specified
exceptions), but the commission itself has discretion to prohibit or
restrict publication of evidence or documents.1 16 The Administrative Procedures promulgated subsequent to the Act further emphasize the absence of a firm mandate to inform the public fully and
completely: the impact statement may be suppressed from public
comment in any one of three ways-after consultation between the
proponent and the administration, after interdepartmental consultation, and by the Minister's own determination.1 17 Under the
Ontario statute, review of an environmental impact assessment takes
place before there is any public involvement at all. 1 1 8 The Minister
then gives notice of the assessment and its review "in such manner as
(he) considers suitable, to the public," whereupon any person can
110. Montana Guidelines § 5(C). See Trzyna, supra note 105, at 148.
111. Montana Environmental Policy Act of 1971, Mont. Rev. Code, § 69-6501 et seq.

§ 69-6517 (Supp. 1975).
112. E.g., Minnesota Environmental Policy Act of 1973, Minn. Stat. Ann. Ch. 116D
(Supp. 1976).
113. North Carolina leaves it to the agencies to consult with the public "if deemed
appropriate." North Carolina, Dep't of Administration, Implementation of the Environ-

mental Policy Act of 1971, at 2 (Feb. 18, 1972), cited in CEQ, Fifth Annual Report, supra
note 105, at 406.
114. Australia, Environment Protection Act, supra note 97, § 10.

115. Id. § 11(1).
116. Id. § 11(2), (4) and (5).
117. Australia, Governor-General, Order, supra note 93, para. 6.2.2., 6.2.3., and 6.2.4.
118. Canada, Ontario, Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 102, § 7(1)(a).
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make written submissions which the Minister is bound to "consider."' '9 He must notify the authors of these1 written submissions
of his acceptance or rejection of the statement. 2 0
The restrictions on public participation in the countries which
have already adopted impact statement procedures may indicate that
as these procedures extend to a wider circle of states the level of
participation of the public will remain similar to that already established in natural resources management, that is, to associating the
representatives of local interests with policies, plans and decisions in
an advisory capacity and seeking comments or advice of professional
or scientific bodies. In the water resources field, there are many
examples of such representation, from users' associations to the
Water Authorities (one-time river boards) of England and Wales, the
basin authorities of France, and the hydrographic confederations of
Spain.' 21 When we come to environmental protection, the Colombian Natural Resources Code also provides for public participation
through organizations. It promotes the establishment of environmental protection associations, similar in principle to water users'
associations, but including inhabitants of the1 area who are not users
of natural resources as well as those who are. 22
Among the socialist countries, the law of the U.S.S.R. provides for
honorary inspectorates, attached to local branches of the All-Russian
Society for the Furtherance of Nature Conservation and Green Belts,
to assist the state agencies and to allow the Society, through the
inspectors, to scrutinize plans for projects affecting the preservation
and regeneration of natural resources.' 23 To what extent this input
has been effective is unknown. The concept of local advisory bodies
persists in the legislation of the socialist countries; the Rumanian law
of 1973 establishes environmental protection commissions, made up
in part of experts from various disciplines, as regional and local
advisors to the National Council for the Protection of the Environ119. Id. §§ 7(l)(b), 7(2)(a),and 8.
120. Id. §9.
121. See generally on public representation of these types of bodies, Johnson and
Brown, Cleaning Up Europe's Waters: Economics, Management, Policies, Chapter VIII;
Lopez, Organizacin de las Comunidades de Usuarios en la R~publicaArgentina, in Actas y
Documentos, la Conferencia Internacional de Derecho de Aguas (Argentina, 28 Aug.-2 Sept.
1968); and Teclaff, Abstraction and Use of Water: A Comparison of Legal Regimes U.N.
Doc. STIECA/154 116-19, 125-26 (1972). See also United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, National Systems of Water Administration U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/17
106-07, 139, 173-74 (1974).
122. Colombia, Natural Resources Code, supra note 90, art. 337.
123. U.S.S.R., On Nature Conservation in the RSFSR, Law adopted by the Supreme
Soviet of the RSFSR, Oct. 27, 1960, Vedomosti RSFSR (1960), No. 40, item 586, transl. in
Soviet Statutes and Decisions 11-23, Art. 16, at 22 (Fall 1972).
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ment.1 24 These experts have a voice in analyzing and reviewing
administrative action in matters affecting the environment and in
examining development plans.1 2 Similarly, Polish town and
country planning (which is regarded as the basic legal form of organizing the natural environment in that country) provides for
organized public discussion and examination of plans by, inter alia,
civic and professional organizations. I 2 6
The role of the public does not end with providing information
and comments, but may extend to a challenge of the final decision.
In the United States the public's supervision of the final result of the
assessment process has been guaranteed and expanded by the courts.
After imposing on the federal agencies the duty to assemble and
disclose relevant information, NEPA did not attempt to design an
institution which would make a final decision on compliance with
the assessment process and on whether the information gathered
warranted proceeding with the project or abandoning it. This was left
to the. agencies themselves, where they had sufficient authorization,
or generally to Congress and the President within their constitutional
powers. The role of overseer was then successfully assumed by the
general courts which used NEPA in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act' 2 7 not only to review the procedural aspects of
environmental decisions but also to evaluate them on the merits.' 28
The courts also strengthened the hand of the public by allowing any
person, who could show a mere personal stake or interest in the
decision, to challenge agencies' decisions.1 29
Supervision by the judiciary has not been adopted in other common law countries which have developed some impact statement
procedures. The final decision tends to be left to the administration;
124. Rumania, Law on the Protection of the Environment, supra note 88, Art. 70.
125. Id. Art. 71.
126. See Brzezinski, Legal Protection of Natural Environment in Poland 38-39 (1974).
127. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
128. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) is credited with extending
judicial review of environmental administrative decisions. In that case the court stated that,
"... . given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements of the Act, we
believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits."
Id. at 298. This view is supported by the Seventh Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486
F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973) and by the Fifth Circuit in EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d
1123 (5th Cir. 1974). But the Ninth Circuit, in EDF v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1973) and the Tenth Circuit in National Helium v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1971),
limited the scope of review to the procedural aspects. See generally on this subject, Teclaff,
The Role of the Executive Branch in Protection of the Environment in the United States, in
Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution (Reports of the
IX Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law) 513, 536-40 (Hazard &
Wagner eds. 1974).
129. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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judicial review is either limited by statutory prohibitions or statutory
grants of administrative discretion,' 3 or circumscribed by restrictive interpretation of who may activate review by the courts in
environmental matters.' 3 In non-common law countries, the exclusion of review of administrative decisions by the courts is generally
more complete, and the review function may be entrusted to
administrative tribunals, or may remain in the hands of higher
echelons of the administration itself. For example, in East Germany
a non-judicial review procedure of all administrative decisions is
being developed.' 3 2 In Poland, appeal from administrative decisions
may be made to higher echelons of the general administration.' 33
West Germany gives the review function to administrative tribunals.
There the tendency has been to refuse standing to associations, or to
limit it to the assertion of very narrowly defined interests.' 34 Thus,
130. See e.g. Canada, Province of Ontario, Environmental Assessment Act, ch. 69,
§ 18(19) (1975) which states that:
No decision, order, direction, resolution or ruling of the (Environmental
Assessment) Board shall be questioned or reviewed in any court and no proceeding shall be taken in any court by way of injunction, declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, application for judicial review, quo
warranto, or otherwise to question, review, prohibit or restrain the Board or
any of its decisions, orders, directions, resolutions or rulings.
For Australia, see Governor-General, Order, supra note 93, and Clark, Redcliff and Beyond,
supra note 98.
131. In Canada, in order to be accorded standing in environmental cases, plaintiffs must
have suffered injury distinguishable from that of injury to the general public. In Green v.
The Queen, 34 DLR (3d) 20, 30 (1973), the Court said, "The plaintiff, in fact, is seeking a
declaration of breach of statutory trust which is not open to him-unless he has a special
interest above that of the general public." Noting some signs of possible relaxation of the
rule of standing in such cases as Thorson v. Att'y Gen'l of Canada (1974), 1 N.R. 25, 43
DLR (3d 1, 17) (1974), Lucas nevertheless states that "the old locus standi principles
developed in the context of public nuisance actions, appeared to be the law" and that
"under well-established principles of judicial review, courts confine review of decisions by
environmental agencies to essentially procedural and jurisdictional issues." Lucas, supra note
104, at 95 and 97.
In Australian law, according to Benjafield and Whitmore:
The conditions which must be satisfied before a private citizen alone may sue
for such an injunction (public rights) are laid down in Boyce v. Paddington
Borough Council (1903) 1 Ch. 109. The individual citizen can sue for an
injunction in the following cases only: (a) where interference with a public
right involves also an interference with some private right of his own; and (b)
where although an interference with a public right does not involve also an
interference with such a private right, it nevertheless causes special damage
peculiar to himself.
In all other cases the individual citizen cannot sue alone, but must join the
Attorney-General.
Benjafield and Whitmore, Principles of Australian Administrative Law 224 (1971).
132. Sand, The Socialist Response: EnvironmentalProtectionLaw in the German Democratic Republic, 3 Ecol. L.Q. 451, 466 (1973).
133. Tarasiewicz, Przepisy prawne w gospodarce wodnej 87 (1975).
134. See Rehbinder, German Law on Standing to Sue 9, 11, 15 (IUCN Environmental
Law Paper No. 3 1972).
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even a system which permits a wide latitude to public participation
in hearings prior to administrative decisions,' 3 1 severely restricts any
public input once the decision has been taken.
Third Phase-Quantification
The slow progress of institutionalization and the continuing reliance on less formal assessment of environmental impacts is caused in
large part by difficulty in quantifying these impacts and comparing
them with economic benefits. Experience in the United States underscores the complexity of including environmental factors in
orthodox cost-benefit analysis.
The principle that benefits of projects must exceed costs was
originally established in the Flood Control Act of 1936.136 It was
elaborated in a Bureau of the Budget circular in 1952,1 3 7 requiring
all water development agencies to use the same guidelines and
standards, and although new guidelines were established a decade
later (in Senate Document 97 of 1962)' 3 8 which did not mandate
this positive monetary ratio, the principle continued to be an informal Bureau of the Budget requirement throughout the 1960's.' 39
To the original planning objectives of the 1936 Flood Control Act
(national economy, regional development, and the well-being of
people), the 1962 Senate Document added a fourth-"preservation"
of the environment, but this objective was honored in the breach
rather than in the observance.
NEPA changed that. Within twelve months of its passage, Congress
gave the Corps of Engineers new directives for water development
planning. The River and Harbor Act of December 31, 1970, required
135. See McCaffrey and Burhenne-Guilmin, The Use ofLaw in EnvironmentalConservation: a Survey of Legal Responses to Selected Problems, in U.N, Dep't of Econ. and Soc.
Aff., Organization and Administration of Environmental Programmes U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/
16, 109, at 122 (1974).

136. Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
137. U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Reports and Budget Estimates Relating to Federal
Programs and Projects for Conservation, Development or Use of Water and Related Land
Resources (1952).
138. U.S. Cong., Senate, Policies, Standards and Procedures in the Formulation, Evaluation, and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and Related Land Resources,

Senate Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong. (1962).
139. See Coy et al., Critique of Water Resources Council's Proposed Principles and
Standards for Planning Water and Related Land Resources, in Goldman, supra note 1,478,
at 479. Typically, in the early 1960s, the benefit-cost ratio of national waterways in the
United States was 3.17:1, but certain earlier projects greatly exceeded this positive ratio,
e.g. the Gulf Coast section of the Intracoastal Canal, which, in 1955, had a ratio of 14.8:1.

See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, at 1365 (S.D. Tex. 1973), citing correspondence between the Intracoastal Canal Association of Louisiana and Texas and the Fort
Worth District Engineer.
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the promulgation of guidelines to assure that possible adverse
economic, social, and environmental effects relating to any proposed
Corps project were fully considered.'
But the Corps appeared
unable or unwilling to come to grips with the problem of quantifying
environmental costs. In its regulations, published in February 1972,
it stated that, "Normally, the use of detailed project cost figures
should be avoided, but general cost comparisons may be used to
illustrate the environmental, economic, or social trade-offs necessary
to achieve objectives." ' 1 ' It was frank to give the reason for lack of
detailed quantification in a contemporary impact statement, ". . the
present state of the art does not afford a basis for quantifying
environmental amenities and project benefits in the same economic
terms."' 42 The district court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke rejected this
reasoning and directed the Corps of Engineers to supply definite
policy guidelines, regulations or standards with regard to methods for
quantifying environmental amenities.'
The demand was exceptionally strict; the federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
overruling the district court, generally disapproved of this directive,' I in keeping with an earlier decision in which it declared that
NEPA could not be construed as commanding an agency "to develop
or define any general or specific quantification process."' ' I
The Fifth Circuit approach had been adopted earlier by the
Council on Environmental Quality in its attempt to come to grips
with precise accounting for the environmental consequences of
economic development in general, and by the Water Resources
Council for the consequences of water development and use in particular.' 46 The Water Resources Council's Principles and Standards
140. River and Harbor Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1818.
141. 37 Fed. Reg. § 7(c) 2526 (1972).
142. Corps of Eng'r, U.S. Dep't of the Army, Environmental Impact Statement, Wallisville Lake, Trinity River, Tex. (Dec. 13, 1971), at 94, quoted in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359
F. Supp. 1289, 1365-66 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
143. 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1973). The court pointed out that, in the
meantime, and until such techniques and guidelines could be worked out:
If the Congress were to decide upon some arbitrary benefit-cost ratio below
which a project would not be considered, only the more meritorious and more
urgently needed public works projects would survive close examination and be
authorized....

Id. at 1381.
144. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, rev'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 991
(5th Cir. 1974).
145. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
146. CEQ, Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.8 et seq.; Water Resources Council, Principlesand Standardsfor Planning Water and
Related Land Resources, 38 Fed. Reg. 24778 (Sept. 10, 1973).
The CEQ Guidelines direct that:
Sufficient analysis of. .'. alternatives and their environmental benefits, costs
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for Planning Water and Related Land Resources retains quantitative
and monetary cost-benefit analysis for economic factors in evaluating
water projects, but abandons it, at least for the time being, for
environmental factors. Though failing to provide numerical values for
environmental factors, they treat them on a par with economic
factors. The alternative plans, which are mandated for each water
project following NEPA, are to be formulated with national economic development and protection of the environment as twin
objectives. In each plan, the beneficial and adverse effects on the
national economy and environment must be accounted for. In addition, for each plan, the beneficial and adverse effects on regional
development and social well-being should be shown. In all, then, the
plan should show four separate accounts, some of them in quantitative and monetary terms, some not. The Principlesand Standardsdo
not mention that the ratio of economic benefits to costs must be
more than one. Thus, it would seem that a plan with an adverse ratio
could be recommended due to the impact of environmental considerations. They also update the discount rate, equating it to the
interest government pays on its borrowing, which favors projects
requiring a lesser capital outlay.
The Principles and Standards require environmental effects to be
presented in descriptive and qualitative analysis, stating that:
To the extent possible ... beneficial or adverse effects will be displayed in terms of relevant physical and ecological criteria or dimensions, including the appropriate qualitative dimensions.' 17
Then they proceed to outline in great detail the factors which should
go into such description. 1 4 8
and risks should accompany the proposed action through the agency review
process in order not to foreclose prematurely options which might enhance
environmental quality or have less destrimental effects....
...In each case, the analysis should be sufficiently detailed to reveal the
agency's comparative evaluation of the environmental benefits, costs and risks
of the proposed action and each reasonable alternative ....
and that:
., agencies that prepare cost-benefit analyses of proposed actions should
attach such analyses, or summaries thereof, to the environmental impact statement, and should clearly indicate the extent to which environmental costs

have not been reflected in such analyses.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(4) and (8).
147. Water Resources Council, Principles and Standards, supra note 146, Standards I.
(H)(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 24808.
148. Elements of. the environment to be described include (depending on the circumstances): (a) open and green space, wild and scenic rivers, lakes, beaches, shores, mountains
and wilderness areas, estuaries, and other areas of natural beauty; (b) archeological, historical, biological and geological resources and selected ecological systems; (c) the quality of
water, land, and air resources. For each element, the method of describing the impact is
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While these descriptive methods for environmental assessment
were being perfected, efforts were also made to produce quantitatively more precise tools. For example, in the Battelle system,
developed for the Bureau of Reclamation, a well-assorted and
balanced team of experts developed the numerically expressed relative weights of seventy-eight parameters that describe the environment. 49
An earlier and equally well-known method developed by Leopold,
of the U.S. Geological Survey, uses a matrix system.I s0 On the
horizontal axis are registered 100 generally identified actions which
cause environmental impact, and on the vertical axis 88 generally
identified environmental characteristics. The resulting matrix, with
8,800 cells, links proposed actions with environmental characteristics. The Leopold system has been criticized as a "check list"
approach that invites the assumption that all parameters have been
included; such an assumption might prevent a careful on-site
analysis.' s
Using the same data base with different evaluation systems, it is
perfectly possible to come up with completely different evaluations
given. In the case of estuaries, for example, their size or measure should be presented in
terms of surface acreage, shoreline mileage, marshland acreage and shoreline mileage, and
water quality. The analysis should then include a description of their biological significance
as a nursery, breeding, and feeding ground for fish and wildlife, followed by an enumeration
of the anticipated improvements, such as accessibility and public amenities. After that,
measures for protection and preservation of the environment-physical, legal, and specialare defined. Id. I (H)(4), at 24809-24816.
149. The parameters are grouped in eighteen environmental components which, in turn,
are included in four categories-ecology, environmental pollution, esthetics, and human
interest. They are stated for the evaluation of all projects in the hope of obtaining a more
uniform and objective procedure. As an example, the aquatic components which are part of
the category "Ecology" are composed of such parameters as commercial fisheries, natural
vegetation, pest species, sport fish, and water fowl. The final product of the analysis, the
environmental impact, is obtained by multiplying a parameter's weight by its environmental
quality. The environmental quality is derived from environmental estimates (the raw or
basic data) through the use of a value function which relates the various levels of parameter
estimates to the appropriate levels of environmental quality. Dee et al., Environmental
Evaluation System for Water Resource Planning, Final Report to Bureau of Reclamation,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Jan. 31, 1972).
150. Identification of impacts is made by tracing a slash in each cell where interaction
between proposed actions and the environmental characteristic may occur. In each identified cell the magnitude of the impact is determined numerically on a scale of 1-10 and
registered above the slash, while the importance of the impact is similarly registered below
the slash on a scale of 1-10. Impacts are determined by the investigator. Actions are divided
into 11 groups, such as modification of regime, land transformation, etc., and characteristics
into five classes-physical and chemical characteristics, biological characteristics, cultural
factors, ecological relationships, and others. Leopold et al., A Procedure for Evaluating
Environmental Impact, U.S. Geological Survey Circular No. 645 (1971).
151. For an analysis of the Leopold matrix system and other methodologies, including
the Battelle index value model, see Warner and Bromley, Environmental Impact Analysis: A
Review of Three Methodologies (1974).
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for the same project alternatives and project area. Moreover, in any
given system it is difficult to avoid subjective evaluation of basic
data; much depends upon who makes the data input and how it is
done.1 s 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Reconciling Conflicting Water Uses
The environmental impacts of water development and use are not
most detrimental
confined within political frontiers: some of1 the
53
effects have occurred outside state jurisdiction.
Like national water laws, international water law was concerned
throughout most of its history with the protection of water uses and
interests across frontiers, through the regulation of water exploitation in general and water pollution in particular. Any benefit to the
environment as a whole was merely incidental. At first these uses and
interests were confined to limited areas close to the frontier and a
number of treaties were concluded throughout the 19th century and
the first quarter of the 20th to protect the regime of frontier waters
and their banks.' I '
152. The Battelle study, for example, relies heavily on the existing literature and on
current monitoring activities of government agencies, especially in developing value functions for water quality. It emphasizes the use of trained personnel in a number of disciplines, and in field testing of the system great stress was laid on team, as opposed to
individual, evaluation and on evaluation of the project area more than once.
153. Some notable examples of adverse transboundary impacts of water development
and use are the effect of the Aswan High Dam on Mediterranean fisheries, the Colorado
salinity problem, and the pollution of the Rhine. See George, The Role of the Aswan High
Dam in Changing the Fisheries of the Southeastern Mediterranean, in The Careless Technology 164 (Farvar & Milton eds. 1972); Brownell and Eaton, The Colorado River Salinity
Problem with Mexico, 69 Am. J. Int'l L. 255 (1975); and van Hoogstraten, La Salinite du
Rhin et le Tribunal de Rotterdam, 1 Env'tal Pol. & L. 73 (1975).
154. See e.g., Treaty on Boundaries Between Their Majesties the King of Prussia and the
King of the Low Countries, Oct. 7, 1816, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil 54-55, U.N. Legis.
Ser., Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International
Rivers for Other Purposes Than Navigation ST/LEG./SER.B./12 (1963), at 737 [hereinafter
cited as U.N. Legis. Ser.] ; Treaty for the Regulation of Abstraction of Water from the Meuse
Between Belgium and the Netherlands, May 12, 1863, 1 Martens Nouveau Recuel G6nral
120 (ser. 2), U.N. Legis. Ser. 550; Agreement Between Switzerland and the Grand-Duchy of
Baden Concerning the Navigation of the Rhine from Neuhausen to Below Basle, May 10,
1879, (1878-89) 4 Recueil Officiel des Lois et Ordonnances de la Confdd6ration Suisse 339
(ser. N), U.N. Legis. Ser. 776; Additional Act of May 26, 1866, to the Treaties of Delimitation Determining Boundaries, concluded Dec. 2, 1856, Apr. 14, 1862, and May 26, 1866,
between France and Spain, 9 Clercq, Recueil des Trait6s de la France 544, U.N. Legis. Ser.
672; Agreement Between Her Majesty the Queen-Empress and His Serene Highness the
Elector-Palatine, May 13, 1779, 2 Martens Recueil 671 (2d ed.).
See also, Agreement Between the Netherlands and France for Determining the Boundary
Between a Certain Part of the Colonies of Surinam and French Guyana, Sept. 30, 1915, 18
Legemans, Recueil des Traitds et Conventions Conclus par le Royaume des Pays-Bas 504,
U.N. Legis. Ser. 228; Treaty Between Germany and Poland for the Settlement of Frontier
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As the need for cooperation and the capacity to inflict injury
grew, the function and areal scope of water treaties grew also; they
developed into instruments either to allocate water between co-basin
states or to provide for joint development of the resource and the
sharing of benefits. An example of the former is the Indus Waters
Treaty of 1960.' 1 ' Within a comparatively short time after the
division of the Indian sub-continent, cooperation in water resources
administration was achieved, despite the imposition of a political
frontier across the formerly unified system of the Punjab canals.
Through the efforts of the World Bank, whose plan became the basis
of the 1960 agreement, the basin's waters were apportioned according to geographical location, the three eastern branches of the system
going to India, and the three western ones to Pakistan.' 16 They are
developed separately, but continuous cooperation is assured through
the establishment of the Permanent Indus Commission and the
machinery for settlement of disputes. I "
Joint development, with sharing of benefits, is found in the
Columbia River Treaty of 1961.1' 58 Under the so-called downstream
benefit theory-that an upstream riparian should share in the advantages which its storage facilities make possible for a downstream
riparian-Canada receives half of the power generated in the United
States with the help of Canadian storage facilities and may sell this
power to the United States if there is no immediate market for it in
Canada.I "' The United States also undertakes to pay Canada for
flood control provided by the latter's storage facilities.' 60
Parallel with the growth of conventional water law, there arose the
conviction that customary rules also governed the use of water and
thereby protected the water-connected interests of neighboring
states. This was strongly expressed by the Montevideo Declaration:
Questions, Jan. 27, 1926, Dziennik Ustaw 930, 64 L.N.T.S. 165; Peace Treaty Between Lithuania and the Russian Socialist Federal Republic, July 12, 1920, 3 L.N.T.S.
126; Treaty of Peace Between Latvia and the Russian Socialist Federal Republic, Aug. 11,
1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 214; Peace Treaty Between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine, Mar. 18, 1921
Dziennik Ustaw 819, 6 L.N.T.S. 129.
155. Indus Waters Treaty Between the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sept. 19, 1960, 419
U.N.T.S. 126.
156. See summary of the 1954 Proposal of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, in Fisher, La Banque InternationalePour la Reconstruction it le Developpement et I'Utilisation des Eaux du Bassin de 1Indus, 6 Ann. Frangaise de Dr. Int'l 669,
671-73 (1960).
157. Indus Waters Treaty, arts. 8 and 9,419 U.N.T.S. 144.
158. Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources
of the Columbia River Basin, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638, 542 U.N.T.S. 244.
159. Id. arts. 5 & 8, 15 U.S.T., at 1560, 1562.
160. Id. art. 6, 15 U.S.T. 1555, at 1560-61.
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In consequence, no state may, without the consent of the other
riparian state, introduce into water courses of an international
character, for the industrial or agricultural exploitation of their
waters, any alteration which may prove injurious to the margin of
the other interested state.1 6 1
It is doubtful whether this stricture, amounting to a power of veto
by one state over the fluvial projects of another, ever became anything more than a recommendation. Subsequent statements on the
scope of the right of states to use the waters of international river
basins drop all mention of such a veto and accept, as a rule of law,
the belief that states are entitled only to an equitable portion of the
water resources of a basin or of the benefits from their development.
Thus, the Salzburg Declaration of the Institute of International Law
states that, "Every state has the right to utilize waters which traverse
or border its territory. ..,.16 2 and that, "If the States are in disagreement over the scope of their rights of utilization, settlement will
take place on the basis of equity ....1 63 The Helsinki Rules of the
International Law Association emphasize the equitable allocation of
water resources even more forcefully, "Each basin state is entitled,
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial use of the waters of an international drainage basin.. .,.64 The
arbitral award in the Lake Lanoux case stresses that any unilateral
must take account of
water development of shared water resources
1
the interests of other riparian states. 6 5
ProtectionAgainst Pollution
As the menace of water pollution increased, rules for water distribution had to be supplemented by rules concerning pollution, and
the latter assumed an ever more important role in protecting the
water resources of neighboring states. Other elements of the environment were protected only incidentally.
161. Seventh Int'l Conf. of Am. States, Declaration on Industrial and Agricultural Use of
International Rivers, art. 2, text in 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 59 (Supp. 1934).
162. Utilization of Non-Maritime International Waters, Resolution Adopted by the Institute of Int'l Law at Salzburg, 3-12 Sept. 1961, art. 2, 49(2) Annuaire de l'Institut de

Droit International 370 (1961).
163. Id. art. 3.
164. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. IV, Int'l L.
Ass'n, Rep't of the 52nd Conf. held at Helsinki, Aug. 17-20, 1966, 477-533 (1967).
165. Lake Lanoux Case (France v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 138-39 (1957):
The Tribunal is of the opinion that, according to the rules of good faith, the
upstream State is under the obligation to take into consideration the various
interests involved, to seek to give them every satisfaction compatible with the
pursuit of its own interests, and to show that in this regard, it is genuinely
concerned to reconcile the interests of the other riparian State with its own.
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In conventional international water law, frontier treaties may have
implied a prohibition against water pollution, but specific provisions
to deal with the problem did not appear until rather late in the 19th
century.' 66 They dealt with particular aspects of pollution such as
its effect on fisheries,'6 7 or, like the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 between the United States and Canada, 1 68 they were limited
to one article prohibiting pollution altogether. This kind of prohibition was no more effective than similar provisions in municipal law
-which began to appear at about the same time 1 69 -as evidenced by
the worsening condition of the Great Lakes.
The realization that existing law was inadequate to deal with the
Great Lakes pollution led to the forging of more effective measures.
The task of finding a solution to that problem was periodically entrusted, from 1912 onward, to the International Joint Commission
(IJC), U.S.-Canada.' 70 The Commission's detailed and comprehensive report on the Connecting Channels Reference, submitted in
1950, introduced the concept of standards into international water
law.' 71 After that, provisions stressing the need for uniform standards began to find their way into international water treaties. For
instance, the 1963 convention concerning pollution of the Rhine
empowered the Rhine Commission to recommend protective
1
measures, which, however, must still be approved by all parties. 72
Nearly a decade later, the Ministerial Conference of the parties to
that Convention, held at The Hague in October 1972, instructed the
166. See Manner in 3 Whiteman, Digest of Int'l L. 1043-44 (1964).
167. Convention Between the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Prussia Concerning the
Regulation of Fisheries in Boundary Waters, Nov. 5, 1892, Martens, Nouveau Recueil (2d

ser.) t. XXIV, 1899, at 153, U.N. Legis. Ser. 716; and Convention Between the Republic of

France and the Swiss Confederation to Regulate Fisheries in Frontier Waters, Mar. 9, 1904,
33 Martens Nouveau Recueil 501 (2d ser.), U.N. Legis. Ser. 701.
168. Treaty Between U.S. and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions
Arising Along the Boundary, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. 548, U.N. Legis. Ser. 260.
Art. IV of the Treaty states that "the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters

flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other."
169. E.g., Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 et seq. (1970).
170. For a history of these efforts, see Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A
Study in U.S.-Canadian Environmental Co-Operation, in Law, Institutions, and the Global
Environment 294, at 300-19 (Hargrove ed. 1971).
171. Rep't of the Int'l Joint Comm'n (U.S. and Canada) on the Pollution of Boundary
Waters 169-70 (1951), summarized in Lester, Pollution, in The Law of International Drainage Basins 89, at 104-05 (Garretson et al. eds. 1967).
172. Convention of Apr. 29, f 963, between France, the Federal Republic of.Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland 119631, Tractatenblad van der Koninkrijk
der Nederlanden, No. 104; text in [19741 Beitrage zur Umweltgestaltung B7, Internationales Umweltrecht-Multilaterale Vertrige, No. 963: 31/1.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

Rhine Commission to draw up a list of prohibited substances.' 71
Similarly, the 1969 draft of the European Convention on Protection
of Fresh Water Against Pollution states in Art. 2 that, "Contracting
States ...(a) wherever possible, agree to establish and maintain
standards of quality for the waters of an international drainage basin
extending over their territories."' "
Whereas these conventions merely postulate the establishment of
standards, the 1972 U.S.-Canadian agreement on Great Lakes pollution, reached after several years of investigation by the I.J.C. and
lengthy negotiation, sets elaborate standards or purity objectives for
various pollutants and activities. It also obligates the parties to
implement these objectives through national legislation,' 1 7 a large
step from the single general article in the Boundary Waters Treaty.
Parallel with the development of conventional provisions, there
proceeded the search for an adequate formulation of general antipollution rules. From equitable apportionment of beneficial use of
the waters of international river basins, which it accepted as a rule of
law, the International Law Association deduced a pollution prohibition,1 76 but only to the extent that such pollution impaired
another state's beneficial use and did not deprive the polluting state
of its own beneficial utilization. The Comment to Article X of the
Helsinki Rules states:
Certainly, a diversion of water that denies a co-basin State an equitable share is in violation of international law. A use that causes
pollution to the extent of depriving a co-basin State of an equitable
share stands on the same basis. By parallel reasoning, a State that
173. The ConventionalLaw of the Environment, in International Environmental Law 25,
35 (Teclaff, Brown, & Utton eds. 1974).
174. Text in Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Report on a Draft of the European Convention on the Protection of Fresh Water Against Pollution (Rapporteur: M.
Housiaux), Doe. 2561, May 12, 1969, at 5.
175. U.S.-Canada, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301,
T.I.A.S. 7312, 11 Int'l Leg. Mat. 694 (1972).
176. Helsinki Rules, supra note 169, arts. IX, X and Xl. Article X provides that:
1. Consistent with thyprinciple of equitable utilization of the waters of an
international drainage basin, a State
(a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the
degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin
which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin
State, and
(b) should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in
an international drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial
damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin State.
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to water pollution
originating
(a) within the territory of the State, or
(b) outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by the State's conduct.
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engages in a use or uses causing pollution is not required to take
measures with respect to such pollution that would deprive it of
equitable utilization. 77
This admirable attempt at formulating a broad anti-pollution rule
in a restatement of international water law' 78 suffers from a lack of
elasticity precisely because it was made part and parcel of a coherent
and logical system. Under the Helsinki Rules pollution deriving from
an otherwise reasonable and equitable use might conceivably do
serious environmental damage before resulting in an injury substantial enough to deprive another state of its equitable share. This could
happen to a state which did not make much use of a river and,
because of a primitive economic base, did not plan to use it in the
near future. Such a situation would not occur if, instead of applying
the principle of equitable apprortionment, the duty to cease polluting arose as soon as one co-basin state's activities caused noticeable
pollution in parts of the river basin under the jurisdiction of other
states. This duty is consistent with trends in municipal law. For
example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
establish as a national goal the cessation of all pollutant discharges
into United States navigable waters by a given date, 1985.17
Though absent from the Helsinki ,Rules, the duty to agree on
standards or quality objectives is fast gaining a prominent place in
the definition of anti-pollution rules. The International Law Association recognized this duty in its formulation of rules for control of
marine pollution,' 8 as did the Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of the
European Communities in their respective Recommendations on
transfrontier pollution and the polluter-pays principle.' I'
A distinction in treatment between existing and future pollution
was made in the Helsinki Rules and retained in the I.L.A.'s marine
pollution rules.' 82 However, this distinction is absent from such
recent conventional formulations as the single text of the proposed
177. Id. at 499.
178. For a critical appraisal of the Helsinki Rules, see Utton, International Water Quality
Law, 13 Nat. Res. J. 282 (1973).
179. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et
seq. (Supp. 1974).
180. Int'l L. Ass'n, N.Y. Conf. (1972), Declaration on Marine Pollution of Continental
Origin, Art. III (a), Proceedings 102 (1974).
181. Organization for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Council Recommendations on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Nov. 14, 1974, Annex, Title B, 1(b), 14 Int'l Leg.
Mat. 242, 244 (1975); European Communities, Council Recommendations on the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle, Nov. 7, 1974, 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 138-39 (1975).
182. Helsinki Rules, supra note 169, Art. X; Int'l L. Ass'n, Declaration on Marine Pollution, supra note 180.
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convention on marine pollution, drafted at the 1975 Geneva meeting
of the Law of the Sea Conference. 1 83
Responsibility for Water Pollution
Rules that establish the responsibility of states for water pollution
are evolving more slowly than the controls per se. Not that this
responsibility could be denied in theory, since it stems from general
principles, such as neminem laedere, or abuse of right, or neighborliness. 84 But rules that would permit application of these vague,
abstract principles to concrete situations are still relatively undeveloped. The Helsinki Rules, which attempted to formulate this
responsibility,'1 8
rely for authority on two cases-the Corfu
Channel case"' and the Trail Smelter Arbitration.187 The first
pertains to damage caused by mining a strait and is generally considered to establish responsibility of states for damage done by activities on their territory of which they had or should have had
knowledge.1 88 The other is more in point, since it pertains to pollution, though to air, not water. In that case, the arbitral tribunal,
assessing damage caused by a Canadian smelter to U.S. citizens,
stated as a general rule that no state has the right to use, or permit
the use of, its territory so as to cause injury in or to the territory of
another state.1 89 This opinion is sometimes quoted to support strict
liability of states for pollution.I' 9 However, it would seem that
since the Trail Smelter Arbitration, like the Corfu Channel case,
predicates responsibility on knowledge, it can hardly be an authority
for strict liability. If strict liability is developing, as it seems to be, its
vehicle is conventions dealing with pollution. 1 9 '
183. U.N., Third Conf. on the Law of the Sea, Informal Single Negotiating Text, Part 111,
May 6, 1975, U.N. Doc. A/C.62/WP.8(III). Article 4 states that:
States shall take all necessary measures consistent with this Convention to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any
source using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and
in accordance with their capabilities, individually or jointly, as appropriate,
and they shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection.
184. On the applicability of these principles to water law, see Teclaff, The Impact of
Environmental Concern on the Development of International Law, 13 Nat. Res. J. 357

(1973).
185. Helsinki Rules, supra note 169, Article XI,
186. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949], I.C.J. 4.
187. Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941).

188. See Teclaff, InternationalLaw and the Protectionof the Oceansfrom Pollution, 40
Fordham L. Rev. 529, 545 (1972).
189. Trail Smelter Case, supra note 187, at 1965.
190. See Goldie, InternationalPrinciples of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 Colum. J.

Transnat'l L. 283, 306-07 (1970).
191. See Teclaff, supra note 188, at 547.
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There is little doubt that, in view of the slow evolution of customary international law, the difficulty of making the law more
precise, and the rapidly growing need for specific and effective rules
to deal with pollution in general and responsibility of states in particular, development will proceed through conventions. As an example
of the interplay between the processes, the 1960 frontier treaty
between the German Federal Republic and the Netherlands clearly
establishes responsibility for damage to water-connected interests
within the territory of the other party, though limiting it to instances
where the other party's objections to projects affecting waters are
disregarded." 92 The 1969 Draft of the European Convention on the
Protection of Fresh Water Against Pollution went much further than
any treaty in force and permitted individuals to recover damages
from the state on whose territory pollution originates.' " However,
bowing to the objections of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe that the provisions concerning state liability
departed too far from existing international law,' I these provisions
were dropped from the later draft, retitled European Convention for
the Protection of International Watercourses Against Pollution.' Is
192. Treaty Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of
Germany Concerning the Course of the Common Frontier, the Boundary Waters, Real
Property Situated Near the Frontier, Traffic Crossing the Frontier on Land and Via Inland
Waters, and Other Frontier Questions, Apr. 8, 1960, Netherlands [19601, Tractatenblad,
No. 68, U.N. Legis. Ser. 757. Art. 63 states that:
(1) If one of the Contracting Parties, notwithstanding the objections raised by
the other Party, acts in violation of its obligations under this Chapter or
arising under any of the special agreements to be concluded as provided in
article 59, thereby causing damage within the territory of the other Contracting Party, it shall be liable for damages.
(2) Liability for damages shall arise in respect only of such damage as was
sustained after the objections were raised.
193. Draft European Convention on the Protection of Fresh Water Against Pollution,
supra note 174, at 8. Art. 7, para. 1, states that:
Any person who suffers damage in any Contracting State arising from water
pollution in any other Contracting State shall be entitled to compensation in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter, provided that, where standards
of water quality have been adopted under paragraph 2(a) of Article 2 for the
international drainage basin concerned, compensation shall be recoverable
only in respect of such damage as shall be caused in contravention of such
standards.
Art. 8 provides that:
The liability for compensation contemplated by Article 7 shall attach to the
Contracting State in whose territory any water pollution arises whether wholly
or in part.
194. Coun. of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Doc. CM (70) 134 (Oct. 27, 1970), in U.N.
Gen. Assembly, Int'l L. Comm'n, Legal Problems Relating to the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, Supp. Rep't 250 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1974 (11) (1974).
195. Text in U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1974 (III), at 251 et seq. (1974).
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Notice of Pollution and Other Damage to Water Uses
While considerable progress has been made in recent years, as we
have noted, to protect water resources from damage inflicted by
water development itself, this progress has tended to be more pronounced in the mitigation or alleviation of harmful effects than in
their prevention. To prevent damage, the first step is possession of
the necessary information by the interested parties. For that purpose, a state which undertakes a water project should have sufficient
data, give notice of its plans to all the states that could be adversely
affected, and should itself be able to obtain all necessary information
and comments pertaining to potentially harmful effects outside its
jurisdiction.
Treaties often specify what information a party is obliged to
supply other parties about its water projects, how it must do this,
and whether consent of the other parties is required. Some treaties
obligate states merely to furnish information. For example, the
Senegal River Statute of 1964 requires basin states to provide
information and to submit to the inter-state Committee for the basin
those projects which might appreciably modify the regime, navigability, conditions of agricultural or industrial exploitation, water
quality, and flora and fauna of the river.' 96 Also, the 1969 Draft of
the European Convention on the Protection of Fresh Water Against
Pollution provides that contracting states shall:
(c) inform the other contracting states about standards in force
under paragraph (a);
(d) from time to time inform and consult with other contracting
states concerned, about the usages of such waters. 97
Other treaties, such as the Treaty of Aachen of 1816 between
Prussia and the Netherlands,' 98 one of the oldest frontier waters
agreements, require consent of co-basin states. More recently, and for
a larger expanse of water, the requirement of notice and consent can
be found in the Convention Concerning Pollution of Lake Constance
of 1960 between Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Austria and Switzerland.' 9 9 In the frontier treaty between the German Federal
196. Art. 3. Text in Andre, L 'Evolution du Statut des Fleuves InternationauxD'Afrique
Noire, 19 Rev. Jurid. et Pol. (Ind6pendence et Coopdration) 285, 299 (1965).
197. Draft European Convention on the Protection of Fresh Water Against Pollution,
supra note 174, Art. 2(2)(c) and (d).
198. Boundary Treaty Between Their Majesties the King of Prussia and the King of the
Netherlands, Oct. 7, 1816, 3 Martens N.R. 54-55, U.N. Legis. Ser. 737.
199. Art. 1, para. 3 of this treaty states:
En particulier, les Etats riverains se communiqueront mutuellement, en temps
opportun, les projets d'utilisation d'eau dont la r~alisation pourrait porter
atteinte aux int6r~ts d'un autre Etat riverain en ce qui concerne le maintien de

October 19761

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Republic and the Netherlands of the same year, 2 0 0 the consent
requirement is comparatively diluted. Though Article 57 goes
beyond notice and requires periodic consultation, Article 62 permits
execution of a project to continue after objection has been raised if
suspension would seriously endanger the interests of the party
executing the project.' It
There is still no agreement as to whether the duty of notice and
consultation exists in customary international law. The Helsinki Rules
merely urge states to furnish data, without making it a legal duty,2 02
whereas the Salzburg Declaration of the Institute considers it a duty
at least to give notice before undertaking works or utilization of
waters.2 0 3 Earlier, the Second International Conference on Communication and Transit (1923) declared that:
If a Contracting State desires to carry out operations for the
development of hydraulic power which might cause serious prejudice
la salubrite des eaux du lac de Constance. Ces projets ne seront realises
qu'apr~s avoir 6t6 discut6s en commun par les Etats riverains, a moms qu'il n'y
ait p6ril en la demeure ou que les autres Estats n'aient consenti expressement a
leur execution immediate. (Emphasis added)
Feuile f~d6rale de la Confederation Suisse, 113 me ann6e, 1961, Vol. 1, p. 1171, U.N.
Legis. Ser. 438, at 439.
200. See note 192 supra.
201. Id. Art. 62, which states that:
(1) Each of the Contracting Parties shall be obligated, pending the conclusion
of the deliberations of the Permanent Boundary Waters Commission or, as
the case may be, of the deliberations between the two Governments, to
suspend the execution of any measures planned by it to which objections
have been raised by the other Party, unless the other Contracting Party
consents to some other arrangement.
(2) Paragraph I shall not apply if a Party to this Agreement cannot suspend
the execution of the measures objected to without seriously endangering
its interests. The rights of the other Contracting Party shall not be affected thereby.
For a more complete survey of pertinent treaties, see Bourne, Procedurein the Development
of International Drainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and to Negotiate, 10 Can. Y.B. of
Int'l L. 212-34, 222 (1974); and Teclaff, The River Basin in History and Law 105-12
(1967).
202. The Helsinki Rules, supra note 169, Art. 29, recommends:
With a view to preventing disputes from arising between basin States as to
their legal rights or interest, it is recommended that each basin State furnish
relevant and reasonable available information to the other basin States concerning the waters of a drainage basin within its territory and its use of,,and
activities with respect to such waters.
203. The Salzburg Declaration, supra note 167, arts. 4 and 5 declares:
No state can undertake works or utilization of the waters of a watercourse or
hydrographic basin which seriously affects the possibility of utilization of the
same waters by other states except on condition of assuring them the enjoyment of the advantages to which they are entitled under Art. 3, as well as
adequate compensation for any loss or damage.
Works or utilization referred to in the preceding article may not be undertaken
except after previous notice to the interested state.
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to any other Contracting State, the States concerned shall enter into
negotiations with a view to the conclusion of agreements which will
allow such operations to be executed...
and the Montevideo Declaration of 1933 stated:
In international rivers having a successive course, the works of industrial or agricultural exploitation performed shall not injure free
navigation on them, but on the contrary, try to improve it insofar as
possible. In this case, the State or States planning the construction
of the works shall communicate to the others the result of the
studies made with regard to navigation, to the sole end that they
take cognizance thereof. . 0.o
In 1973, in its revised draft propositions on the law of international
rivers, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee insisted that:
A state which proposes a change of the previously existing uses of
the waters of an international drainage basin that might seriously
affect utilization of the waters by another co-basin state, must first
consult with the other interested co-basin states.... 206
Thus, the formulation in the Helsinki Rules notwithstanding, it
would seem that the requirement of previous notice has entered the
stream of international customary law, at least when substantial
injury is inflicted on the utilization of water resources of co-basin
states. 2 0 7
Protection of the Environment as a Whole and Duty of Notice
Duty to give notice extends beyond damage to water resources in
instruments concerned with the protection of the environment as a
whole, incidentally adding weight to the requirement of notice in
water law proper. The question of exchange of environmental
information was laid before the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment, whose Recommendations were approved by a
204. Second Int'l Conf. on Communication and Transit (held at Geneva, 1923), Convention Relating to the Development of Hydro-electric Power Affecting More than One State,
Dec. 9, 1923, art. 4, 36 L.N.T.S. 83.
205. Montevideo Declaration, supra note 161, art. 8.
206. Asian-African Legal Consultative Comm., Report of the Fourteenth Session, New
Delhi, Jan. 10-17, 1973, at 7-14, Proposition X, text in U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1974 (11), at 230

(1974).
207. This view is supported by Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International
Drainage Basins, 22 U. Toronto L.J. 172, 204-06 (1972). See also Utton, International
Water Quality Law, 13 Nat. Res. J. 283, 306 (1973), who says:
However, reasonableness would require prior notice and consultation. A ripar-

ian, to satisfy minimal standards of reasonableness, must notify coriparians
who might be adversely affected by proposed developments or activities.
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resolution of the U.N. General Assembly and reiterated in the subsequent declarations2 of that body dealing with the development of
natural resources. 08
Preparatory documents of the Conference recommended that the
principle be upheld:
That nations agree that when water resources activities are contemplated that may have an environmental effect on another country,
the other country be notified well in advance of the activity
envisaged. 20 9
This was clear recognition on an international plane of the necessity
to consider environmental factors other than water, and to give
notice, when planning the development of water resources. Had this
recommendation been accepted by the Conference and, subsequently, by the General Assembly in the wording proposed, it could
have established a legal duty. However, the text was weakened during
the Conference by the Brazil and Uganda amendments which, taken
together, read as follows:
...the following principles should be considered by the states concerned when appropriate... (Brazil)
...
that nations agree that when major water resources activities are
contemplated that may have a significant environmental effect on
another country, the 2other
country be notified well in advance of
1
the activity. (Uganda) 0
The General Assembly did not change this wording. The principle
now establishes no legal duty: at best it remains a recommendation
to be followed at the discretion of the states concerned.
In contrast, two later declarations of the General Assembly
adopted strictly mandatory language. On January 15, 1974; the
General Assembly passed a resolution on cooperation in the field of
the environment concerning natural resources shared by two or more
states, in which it stated that "cooperation between countries sharing
such natural resources and interested in their exploitation must be
developed on the basis of a system of information and prior consultation within the framework of the normal relations existing between
208. 27 U.N., Gen. Assembly, Res. 2996 (1972). For the declarations on natural resources, see infra, notes 211 and 212.
209. Recommendation 159 in U.N. Doc. A/C.48/7, Environmental Aspects of Natural
Resources Management, Subject Area II, F, Considerations for Action.
210. The Brazilian amendment was contained in AIC.48/C.2/CRP.14. The Uganda
amendment was proposed at the Plenary session of June 15, 1972, U.N. Doc.
AJC.48/CRP.I 2/Add. 1. (Emphasis added).
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them." 2' ' Again, in the resolution which embodies the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, Article 3 states:
In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more
countries, each state must cooperate on the basis of a system of

information and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use
of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interest
of others. 2 ' 2
The most recent multilateral and bilateral agreements concerned
with the environment follow the Stockholm Conference in their
insistence on notice and consultation, reinforcing the argument for
the emergence of their obligatory character. For example, the Final
Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe of 1975 proclaims that:
The participating States are resolved that cooperation in the field of
the environment will be implemented in particular through:
consultations on various aspects of environmental protection, as
agreed upon among countries concerned, especially in connection
2
with problems which could have international consequences. ' 3
Bilateral treaties that stress notice and cooperation include the
environmental agreements concluded by the United States with the
U.S.S.R. and the German Federal Republic, 2' 4 and the CanadaUnited States agreement of 1975 on exchange of information concerning weather modification activities. 2 ' s
Responsibility for EnvironmentalDamage
The Stockholm Conference Declaration confirmed, in positive
terms denoting obligation, the responsibility of states for environmental damage to other states through activities on their territory,
and this, of course, includes activities concerned with water development. Principle 21 of the Declaration asserts that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
211. 28 U.N., Gen. Assembly Res. 3129 (1974), 13 Int'l Leg. Mat. 232 (1974) (Emphasis
added).
212. 29 U.N., Gen. Assembly Res. 3281 (1975), 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 251 (1975).
213. Conf. on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, Aug. 1, 1975,
at 104-05, 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1292, 1309 (1975).
214. U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany, Agreement for Cooperation in Environmental
Affairs, May 9, 1974, text in 70 Dep't of State Bull. 673 (June 17, 1974); U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23, 1972, 11
Int'l Leg. Mat. 761 (1972).
215. Canada-U.S., Agreement on the Exchange of Information on Weather Modification
Activities, Mar. 26, 1975, 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 589 (1975).

October 1976]

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond the limit of national jurisdiction. 2 1 6
Principle 21 goes beyond a mere recommendation, which most of
the Stockholm Report undoubtedly does not, to extend the responsibility of states for damage to the environment caused by water
development, strengthening the responsibility for damage to water
resources in the process. The opening statement, which announces
that the Conference, through the Declaration, "states the common
conviction," 2 ' 7 can be interpreted as an acceptance by the participating states of those parts of the Declaration which were couched
in positive, obligatory form as binding legal rules. Furthermore, the
Stockholm Report, containing the Declaration, was confirmed by the
General Assembly. 2 1 8 As a rule, a General Assembly declaration is
not binding, but when it contains a statement of general rules of
conduct its adoption means that these rules, if stated in obligatory
form, are accepted as the expression of existing law, at least by those
states which did not vote against the declaration. Voting on such a
declaration means concensus on the rules contained in it, which then
becomes the basis of their binding force. 2 ' 9
Responsibility for environmental damage through water development does not have to rely on the binding character of the Stockholm Declaration, however. Principle 21 of the Declaration simply
gave precision to, and permitted application to the environment of,
the general rules inherent in the principles of neminem laedere, sic
utere tuo, abuse of right, and the prohibition on use of state territory
to the detriment of other states. To be applicable to a particular
216. U.N., Gen. Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment held at Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 U.N. Doc. AIC.48/14 (1972) (hereinafter
cited as Stockholm Report), at 5.
217. Id. at 4.
218. The importance of Principle 21 was expressly recognized by the U.N. Gen.
Assembly's Second Comm. in Draft Resolution III
of its Report, which states:
Recalling principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration ...concerning the international responsibility of States in regard to the human environment,
Bearing in mind that those principles lay down the basic rules governing the
matter,
Declares that no resolution adopted at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly can affect principles 21 and 22. ..
See U.N. Conf. on the Human Environment, Report of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc.
No. A/8901 (1972). This was adopted by 27 U.N. Gen. Assembly Res. 2996 (1972).
219. See generally Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General
Assembly of the United Nations 24-25 (1966).
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situation, these principles need more specific rules. Principle 21 is a
more specific rule, performing in this respect a function similar to
that performed, according to some commentators, by the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights vis-d-vis the provisions on human rights
contained in the U.N. Charter, which were considered too vague to
be binding. It was argued that, though the Human Rights Declaration
itself was not binding, it became so in conjunction with the provisions of the Charter, which needed only sufficient precision to bring
out their binding character. 2 20

Responsibility for environmental injury is further elaborated in

the Recommendations of the OECD 2 2' t and in the 1974 Stockholm
Convention on the Protection of the Environment. 2 2 2 All have the
limitation, however, that they are confined to the effects of water
pollution, which is only one aspect of the environmental damage that
can be caused by exploitation of water resources. The OECD Recommendations advocate the polluter-pays principle and the right to sue
on a non-discriminatory basis in the state where the pollution
originated, thus eliminating one of the stumbling blocks to implementing liability for pollution pinpointed by a former member of the
ICJ, Judge Read. 2 2 3 The Stockholm Convention actually prescribes
a non-discriminatory right to seek redress before the courts and
administrative agencies of the country from which the pollution

comes.

2 24

220. On human rights, see Wright, National Courts and Human Rights, 45 Am. J. Int'l L.
62 (1951), who says:
In view of these divergencies in American practice, it is fortunate that the
courts have before them the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a guide
to the interpretation of Article 56 in the Charter. While not a treaty, the
Declaration is of great interpretative value, manifesting the opinion of the
United Nations as to the scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Id. at 77. See also Ezejiofor, Protection of Human Rights Under the Law 88 (1964).
221. OECD, Council Recommendations, Titles C and D, supra note 181.
222. Convention on the Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden, Feb. 19, 1974, 13 Int'l Leg. Mat. 591 (1974).
223.
It was the general opinion of the lawyers concerned at the time that the
British Columbian courts would be compelled to refuse to accept jurisdiction
in suits based on damage to land situated outside of the province. Apart,
therefore, from the practical difficulty confronting some hundreds of claimants in bringing suit in a foreign forum, there was the moral certainty that
they would lose.
Read, The Tail Smelter Dispute, 1 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 213, 222 (1963).
224. Art. 3 states that:
Any person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance caused by
environmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State shall have the
right to bring before the appropriate Court or Administrative Authority of
that State the question of the permissibility of such activities, including the
question of measures to prevent damage, and to appeal against the decision of
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InternationalEnvironmentalImpact Statements
International environmental law is not only affirming and
strengthening the need for adequate exchange of information between neighboring states concerning the possible impact of their
water development on the environment and the responsibility for
injury caused by such impact, but is also gradually forging rules for
total assessment of transboundary environmental impacts, including
the effects of water use and development. A beginning was made at
the Stockholm Conference which, in its Report, goes well beyond
exchange of informatiorf. Recommendation 60 suggests that audits
of projects be conducted jointly by the United Nations and the states
concerned even before they are completed, 2 25 and Recommendation 61, which is quite close in language to NEPA, urges:
...that the Secretary-General, in cooperation with governments
concerned, and the appropriate international agencies, provide that
pilot studies be conducted in representative ecosystems of international significance to assess the environmental impact of alternative
approaches
to the survey, planning and development of resource
22 6
projects.
These recommendations are concerned with environmental effects in
general (which, by implication, include water uses), but the need for
assessment of the environmental impact of water development and
use in particular is stressed in the section of the Report pertaining to
water resources. Recommendation 51 (c) asserts the need for assessment of environmental effects of existing water uses and, conversely,
Recommendation 48 focuses attention on the necessity to control
side effects of the exploitation of natural resources on water and
2
water uses. 2 7
the Court or the Administrative Authority to the same extent and on the same
terms as a legal entity of the State in which the activities are being carried out.
The provisions of the first paragraph of this Article shall be equally applicable
in the case of proceedings concerning compensation for damage caused by
environmentally "harmful activities. The question of compensation shall not be
judged by rules which are less favorable to the injured party than the rules of
compensation of the State in which the activities are being carried out.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 222, at 592.
225.
It is recommended that the Secretary-General, in cooperation with governments concerned and the appropriate international agencies, arrange for
systematic audits of natural resource development projects in representative
ecosystems of international significance to be undertaken jointly with the
governments concerned after, and where feasible before, the implementation
of such projects.
Stockholm Report, supra note 216, at 37.
226. Id. at 38.
227. Id. at 32-33. Recommendation 51(c)(v), moreover, would promote, "Joint study of
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The recommendations, like NEPA, do not mandate any course of
action once the information is gathered and assessment of the impact
made, nor do they presume to give anyone the right of final approval
or disapproval of environmentally significant programs. However,
when the interests of other states are not properly considered and
substantial damage occurs, there is a responsibility to the injured
state, in accordance with Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
which, as noted above, 2 2 8 crystallizes general rules of international
law on this subject.
The Stockholm Conference set up a broad and rather vague framework, which the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in
Nairobi, itself a result of the recommendations of the Conference,
has assumed the task of filling in. From its own initial reports,
UNEP's role is seen to be not unlike that of the Council on Environmental Quality in the United States. The CEQ helps federal agencies
to fulfill their duties under NEPA through guidelines and standards
which, though not mandatory, are highly persuasive, the more so
because they embody pertinent rulings of the courts. In much the
same way, UNEP proposes to develop codes, guidelines and standards
for the use of states and international agencies.
Addressing the problem of technical expertise, the Executive
Director of UNEP urged that a program of training and assistance be
established for officials of the developing countries to acquaint them
more fully with "the techniques and principles to be used for the
assessment of environmental impact as an integral part of the formulation and implementation of development plans and projects. "2 2 9 His recommendations concerning natural resources shared
by two or more states contain in embryo a number of the concepts
currently in use in the preparation of impact statements-the timing
of the statement; the information to be included in it; the arrangements for review and consultation; and the filing of the information
the causes and symptoms of problems related to water resources, taking into account the
technical, economic, and social considerations of water quality control." Id. at 33. Recommendation 48 requires that:
...Governments, and the Secretary-General in cooperation with the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and other United Nations
organizations concerned, as well as development assistance agencies, take steps
to ensure international cooperation in the research, control and regulation of
the side effects of national activities in resource utilization where these affect
the aquatic resourcesof other nations..., Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
228. See notes 221-29 supra and accompanying text.
229. Report of the Executive Director, UNEP, Co-operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, at 46, para. 94(b) U.N.
Doc. UNEP/GC/44 (1975).
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agency which would, in turn, disseminate it to
with an independent
2
interested parties. 31
The impact statement concept was specifically elaborated within
UNEP in the Draft Principles of Conduct prepared by Ambassador
Arnaud of Argentina on natural resources shared by two or more
states.2 3' Article 7 requires the transmission of pertinent information to enable the state concerned to make an environmental assessment, and Article 9 provides for joint assessment of the intended
activity if a co-sharing state requests it, thus putting the onus of
impact evaluation equally on the state undertaking the activity. The
Working Group, at its meeting in January 1976, accepted the requirement of environmental assessment but hedged by modifying the
language to include the phrases "as far as practicable" and "significantly affecting the environment." '2 32 The logical next step is
recognition that the requirement to assess transboundary environmental impacts is not only desirable but has become a duty and an
obligation.
The practical results of these elaborate recommendations are still
limited, but the impact statement has begun to appear in international agreements. In the 1974 agreement between the United States

and the German Federal Republic it is a form of cooperation, not a
binding obligation. 2 3 An agreement on use of the lower Mekong
Basin requires presentation to other basin states of a detailed study
of all possible detrimental environmental effects of the mainstream
project proposed. 2 34 This is surely equivalent to an environmental

230. Id. at 43, para. 87(d). See also Report of the Governing Council of the United
Nations Environment Programme on the Work of its Third Session, Nairobi, 17 April-2 May,
1975, at 82-86, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/55 (1975), and Decision 44 (III) at 124-25.
231. U.N. UNEP, Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources
Shared by Two or More States, Nairobi, 12-23 January 1976, Draft Principlesof Conduct,
working paper submitted by H.E. Ambassador D. Vicente Guillermo Arnaud, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/IG.2/3 (1975).
232. U.N. UNEP, Governing Council Fourth Session, Nairobi, 30 Mar.-14 Apr., 1976,
Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared
by Two or More States on the Progress Made at its First Meeting Held in Nairobi from 12 to
22 January 1976, at 7 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/74 (1976), p. 7. The pertinent section reads as
follows:
States should, as far as practicable, make environmental assessments before
engaging in any activity with respect to a shared natural resource which may
create a risk of significantly affecting the environment of another State or
States sharing that resource.
233. U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany, Agreement for Cooperation in Environmental
Affairs, arts. 11 (F) and III (C), text in 70 Dep't State Bull. 673, 674 (1974).
234. Comm. for Co-Ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, Joint
Declaration of Principles for Utilization of Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin, Vientiane,
Jan. 31, 1975. Art. XVII provides that:
The Basin State or States, whether territorial or not, which undertake the
project shall present well in advance to the other Basin States for formal
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impact statement. The Informal Single Negotiating Text of the Law
of the Sea Conference explicitly requires a statement of assessment
2
3 1
of the impact of activities in the sea on the marine environment.
However, since its uses qualifying terms such as: "reasonable
grounds," "may cause," "substantial pollution," and "as far as practicable," the language of this text is weaker than that of the Mekong
Declaration.
Though the concept of environmental assessment and of the impact statement is finding its way into bilateral and multilateral agreements, as long as this remains infrequent it is municipal law that
must play the more important role, not only in mitigating transboundary effects of water projects, but also in establishing the
impact statement as a rule of law through consistent state practice.
Even before such a rule is established, it may be argued that, since
there exists an international duty of notice, such duty implies the
obligation to transmit the impact statement whenever it is mandated
by municipal law in cases of transboundary or foreign effects of
domestic projects. Thus, though still a rule of municipal law, the
environmental impact statement then acquires a transnational
character through its transboundary or foreign effect and becomes an
important, though still not internationally mandated, aspect of the
international duty of notice and information.
In the United States, NEPA itself mandates seeking international
cooperation in environmental asessment 2 3 6 and filing impact statements if projects with transboundary or foreign effects are major
federal actions.2 3' Though NEPA does not require communication
agreement prior to the project implementation a detailed study on all possible
detrimental effects including short and long-term ecological impacts which can
be expected within the territory of other Basin States as a result of the
proposed mainstream project. The procedures and amounts of damages compensation shall be included in the above study.
235. U.N., Third Conf. on the Law of the Sea, Informal Single Negotiating Text, pt. Ill,
art. 15, at 5 U.N. Doc. A/C.62/WP.8/PART II1 (1975). This reads:
When States have reasonable grounds for expecting that planned activities
under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of the
marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate
reports of the results of such assessments in the manner provided....
236. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(F) (Supp. 1976).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970). Among U.S. federal agencies which have filed impact
statements on transboundary or foreign projects are the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Transportation. See Appelbaum, Controlling the
Environmental Hazards of InternationalDevelopment (comment), 5 Ecol. L.Q. 321, 347
n.154 (1976). In the water resources field, impact statements have been prepared, for
example, for the Colorado River International Salinity Control Project, affecting Mexico.
See Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, Fifth Annual Report 392
(1974); also 102 Monitor No. 8, 61 (1974).
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of impact statements to foreign governments, once such a statement
has been filed and opened to public scrutiny, it has become accessible outside the United States. This is perhaps why the impact statement procedures of some of the agencies with an international sphere
of activity deviate from those of a purely domestic character,
especially as to full disclosure. The regulations for the International
Boundary and Water Commission, United States-Mexico, for
example, provide that impact statements should not "normally
include statements with respect to positions other than the optimum
position of the United States in any ensuing negotiation or discus-

sion.,

2381

Much, of course, depends on the character of the agency. For
example, the draft procedures of the Agency for International
Development (AID), 2 39 which are directed towards projects and
activities wholly outside the United States, reflect the nature of its
relationship with recipient countries. No restraints are placed on
disclosure of information, except material classified or administratively controlled. 2 4 o Copies of an assessment are to be furnished to
the host government and consultations are to be held between AID
staff and the host government on the results and significance of a
completed assessment before a project is authorized. 2 ' Where
activities are not country-specific, the draft environmental impact
statement must be circulated via AID's overseas Missions to affected
governments for information and comment.2 4 2 In addition, where
the potential effects of a development are likely to extend beyond
the frontiers of a recipient country, AID is required to urge the
recipient country to consult with its neighbor(s) in advance of a
project approval and to negotiate "mutually acceptable accommodations.,, 2 3 Moreover, recipient countries have an input to the assessment process, since the procedures require collaboration "to the
maximum extent possible" in obtaining data, conducting analyses
and considering alternatives. 2 4 Where baseline data and trained
local personnel are lacking, it is the AID Missions' duty to "en238. International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S. and Mexico, Operational Procedures, § 17(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 9868, 9874 (Mar. 14, 1974). This may have been modified by
the Commission's 1976 Regulations for Compliance with the Freedom of Information Act,
41 Fed. Reg. 8474 (Feb. 27, 1976).
239. For draft procedures of the Agency for Int'l Development, see 41 Fed. Reg. 12896
(Mar. 29, 1976).
240. Id. § VI C13, 41 Fed. Reg. 12900. Or where "emergency circumstances or considerations of foreign policy" make it necessary to modify review procedures. Id. at § VII.
241. Id. at § VI D.
242. Id. at § § VI D and VII.
243. Id. § VI C 13.
244. Id. § VI B.
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courage and be responsible to host-country requests for training or
technical assistance."'1I These impact statement procedures of AID
illustrate how municipal law, through its extraterritorial reach, in
favorable circumstances, may be shaping not only the mutual relationships of individual countries but international law itself.
CONCLUSIONS
The era when water resources could be developed in comparative
isolation, with little regard for the effect on other elements of the
environment, is finally coming to an end, both on a national and on
an international plane. In the United States, the year 1969 may be
taken as marking the close of a period of more than 60 years when
optimal development of all water resources was sufficient justification for any project. During that period the concept of the river
basin was launched as an areal unit for maximizing the use of water
and, in some instances, other resources as well. It was then, too, that
the idea of the valley authority as a super-agency for the development of all resources of the river basin was conceived, and in a few
cases implemented. But this all-embracing basin administration had
very limited success. The separate and often isolated water resources
agency remained the dominant institutional form until the recent
revival of multipurpose resources agencies on a much larger scale
than the valley authorities.
The idea of environmental super-agencies (which include water in
their scope) appeared almost simultaneously at the end of the 1960s
in several countries-notably the United States, Great Britain, and
Sweden. These institutions differ from the valley authorities by the
emphasis on protection in their mandate, and, incidentally, they tend
to create conditions which facilitate the transition from an informal
to a formal process of assessment of the environmental impacts of
water development and use.
In the United States, institutionalization of environmental assessment through the legally mandated requirement of an environmental
impact statement was done through the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). The concept has already spread to Canada and
Australia and has been accepted in Colombia. However, in those
countries public participation in the actual process of environmental
assessment has not, so far, been allowed to reach the same level as in
the United States. Supervision by the public in the United States has
been assured through the enlarged scope of judicial review of administrative actions. But, the very success of this control might have
245. Id. § VI B.
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impeded the search for firmer foundations for environmental protection than the rather volatile public opinion.
This success of the courts, and perhaps, also, the specter of a
super-agency, may have lurked behind the rejection of special environmental tribunals by the President's Report to Congress on the
Advisability of Establishingan Environmental Court System.2 4 6 The
rejection was supported not only by most of the federal agencies, but
also by the major environmental associations which were quite
pleased with the role so far played by the courts and obviously
preferred the benevolent devil they knew to one they didn't know.
In addition, the belief that the courts are not now, and are not likely
to be, overburdened by environmental litigation played a major part
in the lack of enthusiasm for special environmental tribunals.
Countries accustomed to special tribunals could use them to give
more efficient protection to the environment. This applies especially
to countries which already have special water tribunals, such as Italy
and South Africa. 2 4 7 These courts have an insight into administrative decisionmaking through their role in administration of waters. In
addition to subject expertise, they are less formal in their proceedings, therefore speedier where speed is essential. 2 4 8 A drawback of
special tribunals, though perhaps to a lesser extent than ordinary
courts, is that their supervision of protection of the environment can
only be ad hoc and discontinuous.
The environmental assessment process could perhaps be assured
adequate public participation and, at the same time, be sheltered
from the ups and downs of public support through establishment of
an independent watchdog agency which would review the environmentally significant decisions of other agencies on its own initiative
or at the instance of concerned individuals. 2 4 9 When appropriate, it
246. Report of the President, Acting Through the Attorney General, on the Feasibility
of Establishing an Environmental Court System (mimeogr. 1973). See especially Chapter

VII, summarizing the more significant factors in the analysis leading to this recommendation.
247. Italy, Royal Decree No. 1775 of 1933, arts. 147-210; South Africa, Water Act, Act
No. 54 of 1956 (as amended to 1969), § § 35-55.
248. For example, in the procedure before the Italian water court, pleading can be either
oral or written. Testimony is also either oral or written, and the evidence, as well as the
manner in which it can be prescribed, are within the discretion of the judge. Intervention in
the proceedings is open to anybody who has an interest in the case, until the stage at which
evidence is being taken, and there is only one appeal from interlocutory and final decisions.
See Teclaff, Abstraction and Use of Water, of Legal Regimes 202 U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/154

(1972).
249. Such an institution was outlined, for example, in the Fundamental Principles contained in the brief presented by the Canadian Environmental L. Ass'n to the Ontario
Government in October 1973 in response to government proposals for an assessment procedure; see notes 118-20 supra and accompanying text. Principle 2, regarded by the Association as the most important element in the environmental assessment process, stated that:
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could, on its own initiative, bring environmental suits before special
tribunals or ordinary courts. The right of an individual to bring a
complaint before such a watchdog agency would have to be limited
so as to be manageable. Proper procedural safeguards could ensure
this, and a good example of the type of entity appropriate is the
European Human Rights Commission, which accepts individual complaints against governments. 2 5 Several thousand such complaints
have been received, but most of them were rejected on procedural
grounds and only a handful were admitted for examination on the
merits.' I' Fear that the creation of such an agency would lead to
caprice and arbitrariness might be alleviated by allowing limited
recourse from its decisions to the courts on these grounds.
In the United States, NEPA does not give the right of veto to any
agency, not even to the Council on Environmental Quality, but in
rare instances other environmental statutes do give one agency a veto
over the acts of another. An example is the Ocean Dumping Act of
1972, which gives the EPA a veto over decisions of the Corps of
Engineers concerning the dumping of dredged material.2 52 If the
view of the District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Sierra
Club v. Froehlke-that the opinion of the agency with the most
expertise in the subject should be binding on the agency preparing
the impact statement 2 5 3 -were to be accepted as a correct interpretation of NEPA, it might be a first step toward the eventual emergence of a watchdog agency.
On an international level, the general rules that have evolved for
the protection of the environment either are directly applicable to
water development or are accelerating the evolution of international
water law itself. While uncertainty continues as to whether international water law requires notification of changes in the water regime
The creation of an independent, powerful environmental review board is a
prerequisite to public confidence in the new procedures.
The powerful and-independent review board, which would sit at all times, in
essence like a court, would give clear substance to the often-expressed view
regarding the importance of environmental concerns. A mechanism which
would still make the Board responsible to the elected representatives would
also be available through the legislature.
2 Canadian Env. L. News 129 (1973) (emphasis added).
250. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 25.
251. In 1971, the European Commission on Human Rights reported 431 applications
registered, of which 395 were inadmissible, 16 were referred to respondent governments for
their views, 15 were adjourned, and 11 were declared admissible. 19 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on
Human Rights 393 (1971), at 279.
252. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c) (Supp. 1974).
253. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1348-49 (1973).
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that may affect waters in a neighboring state, 2 4 a requirement of
notice of any activities (including water projects) that may bring
about transfrontier environmental impacts is almost routinely
included in the pronouncements of international bodies and in
international agreements dealing with the environment. 2 s s
The restatement in the Stockholm Conference principles of state
responsibility for transfrontier environmental injury provides a more
solid foundation for international responsibility for water pollution
than any deductions from the principle of neminem laedere or the
pronouncements of international tribunals in cases not connected
with water pollution. Furthermore, precise implementation rules
pertaining to responsibility for water pollution, including nondiscrimination and access to foreign courts, are being defined in
declarations and treaties concerned with pollution in general.
Finally, the international environmental impact statement was
recommended by the Stockholm Conference for adoption by states
as part of conventional environmental law. The development of
impact assessment rules has become one of the aims of UNEP and
the requirement of an impact statement has already been included in
the proposals for the Law of the Sea treaty. 2 16 Once it leaves the
twilight zone to become a rule of general international environmental
law-which is a matter of time only, since it is both reasonable and
necessary-it will also become part and parcel of international water
law. In the meantime, provisions requiring an environmental impact
statement should be included in all restatements of international
water law and, as a matter of course, in new water treaties.
Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of environmental concern on
international water law is not the evolving impact statement requirement; it may be the gradual municipalization of international water
law and, vice versa, the gradual internationalization of municipal
water law. What seem to be emerging, with the impact statement as
their principal tool, are rules pertaining to environmental effects in
general, and to environmental effects of water development and use
in particular, wherever they are felt. The road is a long one yet, but
the first steps have been taken.

254. See notes 201-12 supra and accompanying text.
255. See notes 213-20 supra and accompanying text.
256. See note 240 supra and accompanying text.

